



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20370

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IN REPLY REFER TO
Pers-82
Ser C07/821

AUG 23 1973

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(Unclassified Upon Removal of Basic Report)

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on COMCARDIV THREE investigative report Ser 023 of
18 Jul 1972

From: Chief of Naval Personnel
To: Judge Advocate General
Via: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in engineering spaces of USS RANGER
(CVA 61) on 7 July 1972

- 1. (U) Forwarded, contents noted.

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By direction

16 NOV 1973

7th ENDORSEMENT

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Judge Advocate General

- 1. Returned: contents noted.

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27 AUG 1973

CM
Reg No. 403334
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ROBERT M. REDDING,
By direction

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MAT 09C:WB
Ser C1480
AUG 1973

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FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on COMCARDIV THREE investigative report
Ser 023 of 18 Jul 1972

From: Chief of Naval Material
To: Judge Advocate General
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Personnel
(2) Chief of Naval Operations
Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in engineering spaces of USS
RANGER (CVA 61) on 7 July 1972

1. (U) Readdressed and forwarded, contents noted.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS NAVAL MATERIAL COMMAND
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20360

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MAT 09C:WB
Ser C1480

6 AUG 1973

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CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified Upon Removal of Basic Report)

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on COMCARDIV THREE investigative report
Ser 023 of 18 Jul 1972

From: Chief of Naval Material
To: Judge Advocate General
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Personnel
(2) Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in engineering spaces of USS
RANGER (CVA 61) on 7 July 1972

1. (U) Readdressed and forwarded, contents noted.

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CVA61/5800
Ser C349-422

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CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal of basic report) 31 JUL 1973

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on COMCARDIV THREE investigative report ser 023
of 18 Jul 1972

From: Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Material
(2) Chief of Naval Personnel

Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
USS RANGER (CVA-61)

1. Forwarded.

2. The subject Investigative Report recommended action to revise pertinent sections of NAVSHIPS Technical Manual, reference (a), to provide quarterly inspection procedures that would include measures such as the use of periscopes and mirrors. Revision to reference (a) is in process and will include the above recommended requirements. Section 9420.61 "Access to Gears" has been revised to include greater security with improved bars and hi-security padlocks. The above information has been promulgated to the Fleet in the form of advisories and instructions. The Preventive Maintenance System (PMS) will revise the Maintenance Requirement Cards (MRG) to provide coverage of the quarterly inspection check on reduction gears as recommended by the Investigative Report.

Copy to:
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVAIRLANT
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMCARDIV THREE
COMCARDIV SEVEN
JAG
USS RANGER (CVA-61)

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By direction

Classified by NAVSHIPS 422

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1978

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20370

IN REPLY REFER TO

JAG:21.1:WHL:scb
Ser: C-011-73
FEB 15 1973

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THIRD ENDORSEMENT on COMCARDIV THREE investigative report ser 023 of 18 Jul 72

From: Judge Advocate General
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command
(2) Chief of Naval Material
(3) Chief of Naval Personnel

Subj: Inves. - Possible sabotage on USS RANGER (CVA 61) on 7 July 1972

1. Forwarded for information and return.
2. The proceedings in this case appear to have been conducted in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Manual of the Judge Advocate General.

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By direction

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*orig basic ltr w/Encls (1) thru (4) ↓
orig 1st, 2nd & 3rd End.*

Rept. ack.

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CONTROLLED CORRESPONDENCE

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Ser 13/ 01250
26 DEC 1972

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on COMCARDIV THREE investigative report ser 023 of 18 Jul 1972

From: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Judge Advocate General

Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of USS RANGER (CVA 61)

Encl: (45) COMCARDIV THREE supplemental investigation CCD-3/33/hw 5800 ser 030 of 20 Sep 1972 with COMNAVAIRPAC first endorsement 5800 ser 011/6809 of 6 Nov 1972

1. Forwarded.

2. The initial investigation into the subject incident was completed on 18 July 1972. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of the first endorsement thereto the initial investigative report was supplemented with additional findings of fact, opinions and recommendations, dated 20 Sept 1972, attached hereto as enclosure (45).

3. The thorough investigative report discloses that during a routine inspection of the main engineering spaces aboard RANGER at about 1400, 7 July 1972, the ship's Main Propulsion Assistant discovered a broken lock on one of the inspection plates for the Number 4 main engine reduction gear. Although no foreign material or damage to the gears was visible, the sump was drained and a paint scraper and several small pieces of copalite were discovered. As power was not immediately available to the jacking gear, the inspection was limited to visual observation of the reduction gears in place and a thorough cleaning of the sump. The Commanding Officer was notified of the incident upon his return to the ship at about 0800, 8 July. When power was made available to the jacking gear about 0800, 8 July, the gear was turned about one half revolution in the ahead direction so the gears would be unmeshing when viewed from the top. As no additional foreign material was observed, the jacking was secured and the sump was closed.

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3. The Number 4 main engine was jacked from 1415, until about 1500, 9 July in preparation for getting underway. At about 0740, 10 July, the jacking gear was disengaged from the Number 4 engine and steam was applied to the system. The engine was spun in the astern direction and then in the forward direction. As the engine was spun forward, a loud metallic noise was heard. The engine was immediately secured. Subsequent investigation revealed damage to the bull gear caused by a large stud which was found in the sump. A second identical stud was found lying between the bull gear and a low speed pinion gear.

4. The apparent inadequate inspection of the Number 4 main engine reduction gear on 9 and 10 July after foreign materials were found in the sump and the length of time that elapsed before the Commanding Officer was notified that an unlocked inspection plate had been discovered, is viewed with concern. A more thorough inspection of the gears, including removal of the gear covers, may have revealed the presence of the two studs. Even though the reduction gear had been jacked through a full 360 degree cycle on 10 July, it is evident that the foreign material did not jam the gears or otherwise cause a noticeable indication that the studs were in fact present. It is apparent that a thorough visual inspection in such cases is essential.

5. The investigative report makes it apparent that specified watch procedures were not being followed on board RANGER prior to this incident. The practice of watches leaving their spaces to awaken reliefs and the tendency of cold iron watch standers to spend the majority of their watches in the control space, vice continuous patrolling, substantially diminished the security of the engineering spaces. In any event, it is questionable whether a single watch stander can provide adequate security in these large, vital spaces. In view of the foregoing, by copy of this endorsement, COMNAVAIRPAC is requested to reevaluate Force policies and directives regarding security of machinery areas of ships under COMNAVAIRPAC's cognizance.

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6. It is not considered that instructions from higher authority or a lack thereof contributed materially to this incident. The investigation does disclose, however, several areas in which directives could be clarified and new procedures developed to improve the surveillance capabilities in critical areas on board ships and otherwise improve related administrative and technical inspection procedures. The following recommended actions will be forwarded by separate correspondence to the Chief of Naval Material for action as is deemed appropriate:

a. revision of pertinent sections of NAVSHIPS Technical Manual to provide that quarterly inspection procedures include measures such as the use of periscopes and mirrors;

b. modification of PMS Q-1 coverage of the quarterly inspection check on reduction gears as follows:

(1) a situation requirement, i.e. Q-1R, to perform the maintenance requirements quarterly or whenever locks, seals, etc. indicate entry into the gears has occurred;

(2) required tools to include mirrors and periscopes to inspect hidden areas as described by NAVSHIPS Technical Manual 9420.112;

(3) a warning that permission to enter the reduction gear must be obtained from the Engineer Officer in accordance with NAVSHIPS Technical Manual 9420.45 and that this authority cannot be delegated.

7. Subject to the foregoing, the proceedings, findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the investigating officer, as modified by the convening authority, are approved.

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Deputy and Chief of Staff

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMCARDIV THREE
COMCARDIV SEVEN
CO USS RANGER (CVA 61)
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Ser 011/0585

5 SEP 1972

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on COMCARDIV THREE investigative report
ser 023 of 18 Jul 1972

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Judge Advocate General
Via: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
USS RANGER (CVA 61) (C)

Ref: (a) NAVSHIPS Technical Manual
(b) NAVINSERVO Report Control #07-08-72N12-AL77-6UNA
of 2 Aug 1972 (NOTAL)

Encl: (43) Statement of LCDR ^{B-6} , USN,
^{B-6} /1110 of 2 Aug 1972
(44) ADMIN COMNAVAIRPAC Conf msg 050356Z AUG 72

1. (U) Readdressed and forwarded.
2. (U) A JAG Manual investigation into the subject incident was convened by this headquarters to identify the damage to government property, security measures and other procedures in effect aboard USS RANGER (CVA 61) to aid in determining what occurred and what improvements, if any, could be instituted to prevent other acts similar to this incident. A separate investigation is being conducted by the Naval Investigative Service Office (NAVINSERVO) to identify the individual or individuals responsible for the damage reported in this investigation.
3. (C) During a routine inspection of the main engineering spaces aboard RANGER at about 1400 on 7 July 1972, RANGER's Main Propulsion Assistant (MPA) discovered a broken lock on one of the inspection plates for the No. 4 main engine reduction gear. Though no foreign material or damage to the gears was visible, the sump was drained and a paint scraper and several small pieces of copalite were discovered. Jacking the bull gear one-half revolution ahead showed no damage and revealed no other foreign matter. Locks were placed on the inspection port and jacking of the No. 4 main engine was commenced on 9 July preparatory to RANGER getting underway on 10 July without incident. Shortly after 0730 on 10 July, steam was applied to the No. 4 main engine and as the engine turbine spun forward a loud metallic noise was heard in the

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FICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER 11652
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1978

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reduction gear and the No. 4 main engine was secured. On reopening the gear, a large stud was found in the sump and a second stud was later found lying between the bull gear and a low-speed pinion gear. While the investigative report does not identify the precise nature and extent of the damage, it has been independently determined that it will be necessary to replace the reduction gears for the No. 4 main engine. The cost of replacement is estimated at approximately \$550,000.

4. (C) It is noted in this investigative report that several findings of fact are not consistent with the enclosures offered as evidence in support of those findings.

a. Finding of fact No. 1 states that the Engineering Officer was notified immediately, while enclosure (2) indicates that the Engineering Officer was not called until after the MPA had removed the inspection plate and he and two other crewmen had viewed the gears. Removal of the inspection plate prior to notifying the Engineering Officer is a violation of Article 9420.54 of reference (a).

b. Finding of fact No. 7 states that the No. 4 main engine was jacked continuously from 1415 9 July to 0740 10 July. However, two of the enclosures cited in support of that conclusion, including the statement of the Commanding Officer, indicate that jacking was discontinued on the No. 4 main engine about 1500 9 July when a leak was detected in the No. 4 deaerating feed tank.

c. Finding of fact No. 12 states that the No. 4 main engine was not operated or jacked from 30 June until 8 July. The enclosure cited does not support that finding. In response to a request from this headquarters, enclosure (43) was provided indicating that finding of fact No. 12 is indeed correct. Failure to jack the engines and the reduction gear daily is a violation of Articles 9411.171 and 9420.114 of reference (a).

5. (C) Other comparatively minor discrepancies include the following:

a. The enclosures cited in support of finding of fact No. 2 do not indicate that more than one inspection plate was used in viewing the gears prior to the morning of 8 July. Finding of fact No. 2 should therefore read "plate" vice "plates".

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b. Finding of fact No. 9 states that the decision for RANGER to get underway on three shafts on the morning of 10 July was "approved" by this headquarters. The cited enclosure indicates only that a report of getting underway was made. This headquarters nevertheless concurred with that decision.

c. Since the gears were turned on 9 and 10 July, it is very probable that the stud discovered on 11 July was moved by the turning. Therefore, it is considered unlikely that the stud was found in the position in which it was originally placed, as indicated in finding of fact No. 11.

d. Finding of fact No. 17 is more properly classified as an opinion.

e. Finding of fact No. 20 includes the opinion, restated in opinion No. 4, that various instructions enclosed with this report place primary emphasis on external threats to ship security and direct internal security towards fire, flooding and personnel safety. While these instructions contain considerable detail on external controls, enclosures (15) and (21) include specific reference to security measures against sabotage of ships' equipment. These measures are equally applicable to both internal and external threats.

6. (C) This headquarters views with concern both the length of time that elapsed before the CO, RANGER was notified that an unlocked inspection plate had been discovered and the inadequate inspection of the No. 4 main engine reduction gears prior to applying steam to the No. 4 main engine on 10 July. A more thorough inspection of the gears, including removal of the gear covers, may very well have revealed the presence of the two studs. Information that both studs were placed in the gears prior to 7 July is available in the NAVINSERVO report on this incident, reference (b).

7. (U) In addition to the violations of normal procedures mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 6, above, it is apparent from finding of fact No. 14 that specified watch procedures were not being followed aboard RANGER prior to this incident. However, the investigative report does not address the issue of responsibility for these deviations and does not make any recommendation either for or against disciplinary action. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Carrier Division THREE is requested to supplement the basic report with additional findings, opinions and recommendations concerning the procedures actually in effect and the responsibility for any defi-

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ciencies or deviations from applicable directives, as well as the deviations mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 6 of this endorsement. Recommendations for disciplinary action, if any, should also be included. This report is being forwarded in advance of the supplemental report to prevent delay in reporting the basic circumstances of this incident to higher authority.

8. (U) The first three recommendations submitted by the investigating officer in this report address personnel usage and personnel shortages. It is the opinion of this headquarters that efforts should be exerted aboard RANGER to first ensure that engineering watch standers are properly qualified and fully performing their duties before additional personnel are assigned. The personnel shortage mentioned in recommendation No. 4 underscores the difficulties in increasing the number of watch standers or assigning covert agents. The applicable Special Enlisted Distribution Plan (SEDP) established by Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet provides equal, if not better, manning in engineering ratings for attack carriers than other types of ships. Though RANGER is currently below the SEDP level in supervisory engineering petty officers, every effort is being applied at this headquarters to correct that situation.

9. (U) Recommendation No. 5 proposes that higher authority establish a policy requiring a thorough inspection of reduction gears ". . . when cause for inspection develops." The degree of precautionary measures taken in any situation must be determined by those responsible for personnel safety and equipment integrity after considering all of the facts and the risks involved. This headquarters can not detail every precautionary measure in every possible circumstance; however, responsible personnel should be made aware of the variety of measures available to them. In this regard, it is requested that the record of this investigation be routed to Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command for consideration of a modification to Chapter 42 of reference (a), to alert personnel to the use of mirrors and auxiliary viewing devices when inspecting reduction gears.

10. (C) This headquarters specifically concurs with recommendation No. 7 for improving surveillance capabilities in critical areas. To aid in detecting unauthorized entry into main reduction gears, enclosure (44) was issued to all Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers, directing the use of high visibility heat shrink tubing on main reduction gear covers and requiring a

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daily physical check of the padlocks and strongbacks prior to starting the jacking gear motor to turn idle turbines and reduction gears.

11. (U) Subject to the foregoing, the proceedings, findings of fact, opinions and recommendations of the investigating officer are approved.

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Copy to:
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COMCARDIV SEVEN
CO USS RANGER (CVA 61) (complete)

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COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION THREE

FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

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IN REPLY REFER TO:

CCD-3/33/sy
5830
Ser 023
18 JUL 1972

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From: Commander Carrier Division THREE
To: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
USS RANGER (CVA 61) (C)

- Encl:
- (1) COMNAVAIRPAC 110313Z JUL 72 ✓
 - (2) Summary of unsworn statement of Lieutenant Commander [redacted] USN ✓
 - (3) Summary of unsworn statement of Captain [redacted] USN ✓
 - (4) Summary of unsworn statement of Lieutenant (junior grade) [redacted], USN ✓
 - (5) Summary of unsworn statement of Commander [redacted] USN ✓
 - (6) Summary of unsworn statement of MM1 [redacted] USN ✓
 - (7) Summary of unsworn statement of MMC [redacted] USN ✓
 - (8) Summary of unsworn statement of Commander [redacted] USN ✓
 - (9) Summary of unsworn statement of Commander [redacted], USN ✓
 - (10) Unsworn statement of MM2 [redacted], USN ✓
 - (11) Unsworn statement of Ensign [redacted], USNR ✓
 - (12) Diagram showing Main Machinery Room #4 ✓
 - (13) Proposed 3 and 4 section watch bills ✓
 - (14) Personnel onboard RANGER; breakdown by rate as of 23 June 72 ✓
 - (15) CNAL/CNAP INST 5500.1B of 1 Dec 71, Subj: Internal Security of Ship ✓
 - (16) CNAL/CNAP INST 5500.3B of 1 Dec 71, Subj: Lower Deck Patrol ✓
 - (17) CNAL/CNAP INST 5500.4B of 1 Dec 71, Subj: Visitors and Guests; policies and procedures for handling ✓
 - (18) CNAL/CNAP INST 5500.5B of 1 Dec 71, Subj: Handling of Civilian Personnel aboard ship for the purpose of conducting business ✓
 - (19) CNAL/CNAP CV SHIP INST 3541.4B of 1 Dec 71, Subj: Material Condition; proper maintenance of ✓
 - (20) USS RANGER INST 5500.4, Subj: Visitors and Guests; policies and procedures for handling ✓

All redactions are B-6

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Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
USS RANGER (CVA 61)

- (21) CNAL/CNAP INST 5400.1B of 1 Dec 71
Chapter 2 - Watch Organization
Section 3 - In-Port watch organization ✓
- (22) USS RANGER INST 5500.2A of 19 May 72, Subj:
Security of the Ship in port (Not yet promul-
gated, but reported as implemented) ✓
- (23) USS RANGER INST 1300.1 of 10 Sep 69 ✓
- (24) USS RANGER INST 5500.2 of 29 July 1969, Subj:
Security of the Ship ✓
- (25) Summary of Incidents on board RANGER ✓
- (26) USS RANGER NOTICE 5510 of 11 April 1972, Subj: ✓
Special Security Precautions in port
- (27) Listing of Temporary Nuclear Propulsion Engineers
presently onboard RANGER ✓
- (28) USS RANGER Engineering Department Instruction
5400.4 of 25 April 1968, Subj: Cold Iron Watch ✓
- (29) Listing of Experience level of officers in
RANGER Engineering Department ✓
- (30) Photographs of number one stud and metal particles ✓
- (31) Photographs showing damage to number two stud ✓
- (32) Photographs of paint scraper found in the sump ✓
of 4 main reduction gear
- (33) Photographs showing the broken lock and the access
plate that was tampered with ✓
- (34) Photographs showing position of number two stud
when it was found ✓
- (35) Damage to bull gear visible through the upper
aft inboard access opening ✓
- (36) Damage to the gears as seen when the casing was
removed ✓
- (37) Damage to gears as seen after jacking over main
engine ✓
- (38) Views taken from 4 control booth showing difficulty
in observing area where tampering occurred ✓
- (39) Sign found in after head on Thursday, 13 July 1972 ✓
- (40) Sign and threat found in #4 Aviation Gas Pump room ✓
on 04-08 watch on Friday, 14 July 1972
- (41) SOS and other inscriptions discovered onboard
RANGER during period 6-14 July 1972 ✓
- (42) Personnel status board of RANGER Engineering
Department which includes temporary personnel
awaiting Nuclear Propulsion Training (listed as
NUCS) ✓

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Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
USS RANGER (CVA 61) (C)

Preliminary Statement

1. An informal investigation has been conducted as directed in enclosure (1) to inquire into the circumstances connected with damage to equipment aboard USS RANGER (CVA 61) which was discovered on 7 July 1972 in port in Alameda, California, and to further ascertain the security measures and procedures in effect in the engineering spaces of RANGER during and immediately preceding the incident. The Naval Investigative Services Officer, Alameda, investigated the possibility of sabotage in this case and agreed to coordination of the investigative effort. Commander _____, a member of my staff, has been appointed to assist me in this investigation and has provided an unsworn statement as enclosure (5). No difficulties were encountered in conducting the investigation.

All redactions are B-6
Findings of Fact

1. While on a routine inspection of the Main Engineering Spaces commencing at about 1400 on 7 July 1972, LCDR _____ Main Propulsion Assistant USS RANGER, discovered a broken lock on one of the number four main engine reduction gear inspection plates. Commander _____ Engineering Officer, was notified immediately. (Enclosures (2) and (33)).

2. No foreign material or damage to gears was discernible through the inspection plates, however, when the sump was drained at about 1830 a paint scraper and small pieces of copaltite (gasket material) were found. (Enclosures (2), (3), (4), (6), (7) and (32)).

3. Power was not immediately available to the jacking gear, therefore the investigation was limited to visual inspection of reduction gears in place and a thorough cleaning of the sump. No damage and no additional foreign material was noted. (Enclosures (2), (3) and (6)).

4. The Commanding Officer, Captain _____ was notified of the findings upon his returning to the ship about 0800, 8 July. The Naval Investigative Service Office, Alameda and the Chief of Staff, Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet were then notified by telephone. (Enclosure (3)).

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Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
 USS RANGER (CVA 61) (C)

5. When power was made available to the jacking gears about 0800, 8 July, LCDR _____ and MM1 _____ jacked the bull gear about one half revolution in the ahead direction so the gears would be unmeshing when viewed from the top. Further jacking with no lube oil in the sump was inadvisable and with no indication of foreign material in the gears the jacking was then secured and the sump was closed. (Enclosure (2)).

All redactions are B-C

6. A combination lock belonging to _____ was placed on the inspection port on the evening of 7 July. It was replaced by a key lock also belonging to _____ at about 1130, 8 July during a visit by two Naval Investigative Service Agents. Two keys to the lock were given to LCDR _____ (Enclosures (2), (6) and (7)).

7. At 1415 on 9 July, jacking of number four engine was commenced in preparation for getting underway on 10 July. The engine was jacked continuously until about 0740, 10 July without anything unusual being noted by the watch. (Enclosures (2), (3), (6), and (7)).

8. At about 0740, 10 July, the jacking gear was disengaged from number four engine and steam was applied. The engine was spun in the astern direction then in the forward direction. As the engine was spun forward, a loud metallic noise was heard and the engine was secured. Subsequent jacking of the engine revealed damage to the bull gear. (Enclosures (2), (3), (6), (7), (36), and (37)).

9. RANGER got underway for San Diego on three shafts at 0855, 10 July with number four shaft locked to proceed to San Diego in order to resume her refresher training. The decision to do so was approved by the Chief of Staff, Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet. (Enclosure (3)).

10. Number four main reduction gear was reopened about 2100, 10 July and a large, damaged stud and metal fragments were found in the sump. (Enclosures (2), (3) and (30)).

11. Further investigation was delayed while RANGER engineering personnel and Hunter's Point Shipyard personnel disconnected the shaft from the reduction gear. At about 2200, 11

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Subj: Damage (possible Sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
USS RANGER (CVA 61) (C)

July while reinspecting the reduction gear through the inspection ports, a second identical stud was found lying between the bull gear and a low speed pinion gear. Damage was evident to the bull gear and the stud. The position of the stud was such that care was required to place it where it could do the most damage and at arm's length from the opening. (Enclosures (2), (5), (31), (34) and (35)).

12. RANGER had gone cold iron on 30 June, therefore number four engine was not operated or jacked from 30 June until 8 July. (Enclosure (8)).

13. Cold iron watches were assigned starting 30 June. Considerable work was in progress in main propulsion room number four from 30 June until the damage was discovered on 10 July. (Enclosure (8)).

14. Cold iron watchstanders were assigned the responsibility of ensuring that only authorized personnel enter their assigned space. On at least one occasion dependents were permitted to visit spaces in a cold iron status. Some cold iron watch personnel were also leaving their assigned post to awaken their relief. The watch takes bilge soundings and makes hourly reports of security and soundings to Central Control via the 26 MC voice system. The one watchstander has the responsibility for security of his full space which has two decks. Since the 26 MC speaker is in the control booth, the tendency is for the watch to spend the majority of his time close to the control booth. A considerable portion of the main propulsion space cannot be seen from the control booth. (Enclosures (5), (7), (11), (12), (28) and (38)).

15. Main Propulsion Room Number Four has two ladder accesses and two trunk accesses. Both trunk accesses exit on upper and lower levels of the number four space. (Enclosures (10) and (11)).

16. The locks that were utilized to replace the broken lock from 1500, Friday, 7 July 1972 when discovered until the gear casing was lifted at 0830 on Wednesday, 12 July 1972 were not regulation series locks and could have been opened by at least one person in the Engineering Department. (Enclosures (2) and (6)).

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Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
USS RANGER (CVA 61) (C)

17. RANGER Engineering Department officers have adequate engineering experience, however, the impending turnover prior to deployment is a matter of concern. Enclosure (29).
18. RANGER Engineering Department enlisted personnel on board are short of allowances, especially in the supervisory ratings. (Enclosure (14)). 17 E-4 and above now on board are assigned for less than two months while awaiting Nuclear Propulsion School. (Enclosures (27) and (42)).
19. Engineering personnel are assigned to four duty sections in port and two sections underway. (Enclosures (8) and (13)).
20. RANGER security instructions (Enclosures (20), (22), (23), (24) and (26)) are in consonance with CNAL/CNAP Instructions, (Enclosures (15) thru (19) and (21)). All of these instructions and the procedures in effect in Ranger place primary emphasis on threats from outside the ship. The major concern for internal damage is from fire or flooding or personnel safety. (Enclosures (7) and (9)).
21. Additional damage has been suffered in RANGER in other equipment and threats have been found in various areas during the period from 25 May to 13 July. (Enclosures (25), (39), (40) and (41)).

Opinions

1. The damage to the number 4 main reduction gear of USS RANGER (CVA 61) was caused by malicious intent.
2. The act was committed by someone quite familiar with the space and the machinery in question.
3. That RANGER's security program has been primarily directed at possible acts of sabotage or demonstrations or other events from outside the ship in consonance with Type Commander security instructions.
4. The primary emphasis on engineering security has been directed toward fire and flood prevention and personnel safety.

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Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
USS RANGER (CVA 61) (C)

5. Personnel actually standing cold iron watches did not always relieve on station as required in enclosure (28), USS RANGER Engineering Department Instruction 5400.4, Subj: Cold Iron Watch, and the provision that "no unauthorized personnel will be allowed in dead spaces" was not adhered to.
6. Either the visual inspection of the gears on Saturday morning, 9 July, was not sufficiently thorough to reveal the presence of the two large studs or the gear box was re-entered subsequent to that inspection and prior to testing main engines on Monday morning, 10 July.
7. If the studs were introduced along with the paint scraper on initial unauthorized entry prior to 1500, Friday, 7 July 1972, then thorough inspection by mirrors and/or a periscope on Saturday morning might have detected the studs thereby avoiding subsequent damage to the gears. It should be noted that a thorough inspection is difficult in that access is limited and contortions of the body are required to see some areas of the reduction gears.
8. Provisions for prevention of sabotage from external sources are satisfactory in RANGER, but provisions for internal security have not been emphasized.
9. A malcontent element is present in RANGER the size of which is not known at this time.
10. RANGER is in a difficult phase of her training cycle following an eleven month overhaul with extensive personnel turnover. Shortages in supervisory rates and the assignment of personnel scheduled for nuclear training for limited periods of time have aggravated supervision/quality assurance shortcomings.
11. Due to the physical layout of the engineering spaces in any CVA and the numerous exposed pieces of machinery, it is difficult to conceive of a watch system which would preclude sabotage by a knowledgeable and determined member of the ship's company.
12. The vulnerable nature of vital machinery spaces and the apparent resolve of one or more members of the RANGER crew to inflict damage to the ship is cause for serious concern.

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Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
USS RANGER (CVA 61) (C)

13. Extraordinary security measures are required to preclude destructive acts by the malcontent element in RANGER's crew.

Recommendations

1. RANGER should increase the number of personnel assigned to the security of critical machinery spaces.
2. Covert agents should be assigned to RANGER's crew to assist in identification/elimination of dissident members.
3. Every effort should be made to bring RANGER supervisory personnel to Fleet allowance level at earliest possible time.
4. Recognizing that engineering personnel shortages exist throughout the Fleet, an incentive program for these qualifications should be adopted. (The nuclear propulsion program presents an example).
5. NAVSHIPS and/or Type Commander policy should require thorough inspection of reduction gears by mirror and periscope when cause for inspection develops.
6. Acknowledging that the physical layout of shipboard machinery spaces and other critical equipment does not lend itself to tightly controlled access procedures, the necessity for an extensive reliability program as an integral part of our recruiting, training and retention program is recommended for immediate emphasis.
7. To assist the limited numbers of watchstanders who are concerned with security, it is recommended that improvements in surveillance capabilities for critical areas be examined. (Closed circuit television, alarm systems and photoelectric cells offer possible assistance.)

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DAMAGE (POSSIBLE SABOTAGE) IN ENGINEERING SPACES OF USS RANGER (CVA 61) (C)

A. JAG MANUAL

1. (C) INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED INDICATING POSSIBLE SABOTAGE TO EQUIPMENT IN THE ENGINEERING SPACES OF USS RANGER (CVA 61) WHILE IN PORT AT ALAMEDA DURING 8 AND 9 JUL. NAVINSERVO AGENTS ARE CURRENTLY ABOARD INVESTIGATING THE POSSIBLE SABOTAGE.
2. (C) YOU ARE HEREBY APPOINTED TO CONDUCT AN INFORMAL INVESTIGATION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, AS SOON HEREAFTER AS PRACTICABLE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF INQUIRING INTO ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH DAMAGE TO THE EQUIPMENT, AND THE SECURITY MEASURES AND

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA0313 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PROCEDURES IN EFFECT, IN THE ENGINEERING SPACES OF RANGER DURING AND IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE INCIDENT. YOU WILL REPORT YOUR FINDINGS OF FACT, OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE INCIDENT, THE RESULTING DAMAGE, ADEQUACY OF EXISTING SECURITY MEASURES AND PROCEDURES AND POSSIBLE DEFICIENCIES AND/OR VIOLATIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY INCLUDING ANY RELATED RECOMMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE OR DISCIPLINARY ACTION.

3. (U) YOUR ATTENTION IS INVITED TO SECTION 0212 OF REF A AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMMUNICATION WITH THE LOCAL NAVINSERVO AND COORDINATION OF THE INVESTIGATIVE EFFORT.

DECS AFTER 6 YRS

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ENCLOSURE (1)

Summary of unsworn statement of Lieutenant Commander
, USN, , 1110

1. I am the Main Propulsion Assistant aboard the USS RANGER (CVA-61). I reported aboard 26 April 1972 and assumed my present duties 29 April 1972. The following is my statement regarding the damage to number four main reduction gear:

2. Friday, 7 July 1972.

All redactions are B-6

At approximately 1400 I commenced a routine inspection of the main machinery rooms. I started with 1 Auxiliary, proceeded through one main and into four main. While in four main machinery room I noted that the lock on the after lower right inspection port appeared out of the ordinary, the bail seemed extended further than the other locks. I reached down and found the lock to be unlocked and I was unable to lock it. Further inspection showed evidence that the lock was sprung open. I called the P-1 Division Office for Ensign . He was at XO's Mast, however, Chief MMC, the Machinist Mate Chief in charge of four main machinery room was present. I asked him to come down to four main. In the meanwhile I sent one of the two fireman for some rags and the second for a large wrench to open the inspection port. He was unable to find one, however he told me MML was in the space and he could get one for me. He did. I made the initial inspection through the port at this time, along with 11. Chief arrived and also inspected the gears through the port. Our discussion at the time, evolved around the possibility of someone inadvertently springing the lock by stepping on it. Field day had been held in the space and three or four firemen had been on the reduction gear cover that morning. During our discussion we discovered a metal object, wedge shaped, on the deck plates about 3 feet from the suspected lock. I called the engineering officer, Commander and reported my findings to him. We decided an inspection of the sump was warranted. I asked if a lock was available and produced a combination lock from his locker. This lock was used to lock the port. said he was the only one who knew the combination. I requested he procure a new set of series locks for the reduction gear as soon as possible. We then commenced to pump the sump dry and I departed the space. About 1600 I was advised we would have about a two hour delay in pumping out the sump as the shipyard was in the process of installing an automatic Bus Transfer Switch in number four switch gear and power would be off.

About 1830 the sump was pumped dry and and myself entered the sump. MMC and about four other Machinist Mates were present. We found a paint scraper beneath the bull gear on the bottom of the sump floor. The scraper was in direct line with the suspected port. Additionally the sump contained what I considered to be an excessive amount of material resembling copaltite, a rubber-like substance used as gasket material. I inspected the entire floor at the sump and found

ENCLOSURE (2)

no other material. Additionally I inspected all the visible area of the bull gear and both sides of the splash panel. I had go out and open the inspection port and shine a light down through the suspected port while I observed from the sump. in return inspected from the port while I directed a light back up from the sump along both sides of the bull gear.

Because of the electrical work in progress we were not able to run the jacking gear motor that evening. I directed the sump be cleaned and advised all present not to discuss our activities on what we had found. My reasoning, to them, was I didn't want to start any wild rumors.

I returned to the log room to inform the engineering officer of my findings, however, the duty engineer, LTJG , informed me he had left the ship for an hour or two.

3. Saturday 8 July.

All reductions are B-6

I reported my findings of the previous night to the Engineering Officer who in turn informed the Commanding Officer.

At about 0800 informed me we had power available so we commenced inspection of the gears. I first inspected the suspected port (low right aft inspection port) then the port directly above and the one directly forward of the suspected one.

We then jacked the gears, using the jacking gear in a manner that the gears opened out from each other (ahead direction). I jacked the gears through about one-half a revolution of the bull gear while inspecting the gears through the upper right aft inspection port. I saw nothing unusual or suspect and heard no unusual noises. I was reluctant to jack the gears for a longer period of time as I had no lube oil in the sump and none circulating through the spray nozzles. I then re-entered the sump accompanied by and made a complete and thorough inspection of the entire sump including the visible portions of the bull gear. We saw nothing abnormal or unusual and nothing which caused me to feel further inspection was necessary. I witnessed the closing of the sump and departed the space. I reported my findings to the Engineering Officer.

Later that morning I returned to the space with two Naval Investigative Service Agents for the purpose of gathering facts, establishing the location of the objects found and for the purpose of taking photographs. Prior to this event I had stated my activities to a tape recording which NISO has. During this visit the combination lock was still in use on the suspected port. I inquired of if he had pro-

cured the new set of locks. He had not so I asked him if he had any padlocks.

He gave me his own private lock and two keys. I placed this lock on the port. The NISO agents continued their investigation and I assisted as I could.

4. Sunday 9 July.

1415 commenced jacking over number four main engine for the purpose of getting underway. This main engine was jacked continuously until about 0740, Monday morning. About 1800-2000 made routine inspection of the main engineering spaces-- conditions were normal.

5. Monday 10 July.

About 0740 disengaged jacking gear and opened the guarding valve for the purpose of testing the engine. Spun number four engine, with steam, in the astern direction satisfactorily, then in the ahead direction (information from MMC). While spinning in the ahead direction a loud metallic noise was heard coming from the reduction gear. The engine was then jacked using the jacking gear while the engineering officer and myself inspected the gears. Our inspection revealed damage had occurred. The full extent was unknown at that time.

About 2100 I, with ENS entered the sump. We found a 12 inch by 1 1/2 inch threaded stud and about a small handful of metal fragments (teeth and stud) the stud was located in almost the exact same location as that of the paint scraper.

6. Tuesday 11 July.

About 2200 I opened the reduction gear inspection ports so that Commander (AIRPAC), CDR (CARDIV THREE) and Mr. (HPNSY) could view the gears for some idea of the damage. We started with the lower left aft inspection port, proceeded to the upper left aft cover, then inspected the lower right aft port and lastly the upper right, aft inspection port. While viewing the gears through this last port, I saw a second threaded metal stud. This stud appeared to be similar to the one recovered Monday evening from the sump. This stud was located in the groove between the lower second reduction pinion gear, right side, and the bull gear after section.

The stud was viewed by myself and later by CDR CDR and Mr.

The Engineer was informed of our findings.

He came down to the space and also viewed the stud in its

position on the bull gear. The stud showed evidence of contact with the reduction gear teeth.

7. Wednesday 12 July.

The after right quadrant housing of the reduction gear was unbolted and preparations were made to lift same. Prior to lifting the cover Captain 7-6 also viewed the stud through the upper right, aft inspection port. Photographs of the stud through the inspection port were attempted. The cover was lifted and a large gathering viewed the gears. The second stud was removed. This second stud was the same size and characteristics as the first one found Monday. It had more gear teeth gashes than did the first one.

Damage to the bull gear was noted as previously described, half-moon chips on the after end of the teeth, random pattern. Additionally three to four smashed teeth approximately three inches long were noted on the after quarter of the bull gear. Position of the damage bull gear teeth in relationship to the pinion gears is shown in the photographs.

The bull gear teeth were above the upper right second reduction pinion, just past disengagement with said pinion, if the shaft were rotated in the ahead direction. Other significant damage to the bull gear was noted on the lower right aft edge of bull gear teeth just prior to engaging with the lower right second reduction pinion if shaft were rotating in the ahead position. This damage appeared to be two smashed teeth approximately two inches long.

After further dismantling, the gears were rotated, (astern) exposing three broken teeth on the lower second reduction pinion gear. This area seemed to coincide with the damaged teeth on the bull previously described with respect to the upper second reduction pinion. No other significant damage was noted.

Summary of unsworn statement of Captain _____, USN,
Commanding Officer, USS RANGER (CVA-61) at about 1930 11 July 1972.

1. Although not necessarily the causative factor in this incident, RANGER Engineering Department, as well as the rest of the ship, has experienced a sixty-three (63) percent turnover of personnel during the recent overhaul. RANGER is presently in the work-up phase for deployment, about half-way through refresher training.

2. When I left RANGER at about 1830 on Friday night (7 July 1972) there had been no report of any engineering problem. I returned Saturday morning and was met on the quarterdeck by the Chief Engineer, Commander _____

_____, who reported that the Main Propulsion Assistant had found a lock broken on one access cover to the main reduction gear to number four main engine. Commander _____ reported that visual inspection of the gears revealed no damage or foreign objects but that they had pumped down the sump and found a standard steel paint scraper at bottom of sump by splash shield. Thorough inspection of the reduction gears revealed no damage and jacking over number four main engine electrically produced no unusual noises. After a thorough brief by Commander _____, I called the Chief of Staff, Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific and reported the accident. I stated that in view of the inspection and no damage that I would not officially make a report, but that I had called NIS agents to investigate.

All sidactions are B.6

3. On Sunday, 10 July we started to light off and number four main engine was again jacked over electrically for about an hour. No unusual noises were detected. Jacking was discontinued when leak in #4 deaerating feed tank was discovered. Hunter's Point Naval Shipyard rewelded seam. About 0740 on Monday morning, July 11, following my permission to spin main engines with steam in preparation for getting underway at 0800, CDR _____ reported to me on the bridge that we had real problems. He reported that when they first tested number 4 in the backing direction, no problems were detected, however, when testing ahead with steam, loud metallic clicking noises were heard and that he was heading for number 4 main machinery room to investigate. About 0800 Commander _____ reported he observed one badly damaged tooth on main bull gear. I had shore phones reconnected and called Captain _____, Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific, Chief of Staff, and reported one damaged tooth on bull gear. I further stated I was getting underway on three shafts with number four shaft locked in order to make my refresher training commitment. I also stated two NIS agents on board to continue questioning. My guidance at that time was to make reports to Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific only.

4. Upon draining and entering the sump to number four main reduction gear Commander _____ and Lieutenant Commander _____ found a threaded stud about 12 inches long and 1 1/2 inches in diameter in the bottom of the sump along with steel particles, apparently pieces of broken gear teeth. RANGER

ENCLOSURE (3)

got underway on three shafts about 55 minutes late (0855, 10 July 1972) and proceeded toward San Diego.

5. The Naval Investigative Service Office at Alameda had been called in on Saturday and six agents had begun an investigation into possible sabotage. When RANGER departed Alameda two agents remained onboard, Mr. B.C. and Mr. B.C. That investigation is still in progress.

7. Technical assistance has been requested from Hunter's Point Naval Shipyard to help assess the damage and to assist in necessary repairs.

Summary of unsworn statement of Lieutenant junior grade
at about 1830, 12 July 1972.

1. On Friday 7 July 1972 I was the Engineering Duty Officer in USS RANGER (CVA-61). As such I was responsible for the cold iron watches onboard. The plant was secured and RANGER was on shore power. Normal cold iron watches includes at least one man in each main and auxiliary space; a minimum of six watchstanders.
2. Cold iron watchstanders are qualified by Division Officers and I can only assume that the watchstanders assigned that day were so qualified.
3. In the early part of the evening the MPA, LCDR [redacted] (who also had the duty), brought me over to number four main engine to show me a jimmied device. He instructed me to keep it low key until an investigation could be completed.
4. At 2000 he showed me the results of his initial investigation, a paint chipper. I did not participate in the investigation and was again instructed to keep it low key. The plan was to perform a further investigation to clarify the events. They were keeping me informed of the progress and that the Chief Engineer had also been informed.
5. At 2100 I went to bed as they were preparing to rotate the gears for further inspection.
6. At 0300 on Saturday, 8 July I got up for the lighting off watch. During that watch I was informed that there appeared to be no further damage to the main reduction gear.
7. We were lighting off one plant one day early to avoid unforeseen difficulties.
8. I was relieved at 0730 and the investigation was still in progress. To my knowledge no damage to the reduction gears had occurred at that time.
9. There had been a continuous cold iron watch in all spaces. Chief (BTCS) was the P-1 Division Duty Chief that day and normally made tours of all spaces.
10. During cold iron watch there is a first class petty officer standing Engineering Officer of the watch at Central Control. Reports from the various spaces are made on the 21MC announcing system of any unusual circumstances and conditions normal every hour.

All redactions
are B-6

CS103

ENCLOSURE (4)

UNSWORN STATEMENT BY COMMANDER

USN,

taken at 1000, Friday, 14 July 1972

I arrived onboard RANGER at about 1700 on Tuesday, 11 July 1972. Personnel from Long Beach Naval Shipyard were onboard and efforts were being made to disconnect the shaft from number four main engine. Upon being briefed by both Captain _____ and Commander _____, I proceeded to 4 main to observe the damaged gears. While inspecting the gears through the reduction gear access plates, LCDR _____, the MPA, spotted a second stud lying between the lower low speed pinion and the bull gear. Although the stud was visible, the location and size of the access opening made it extremely difficult to see the stud. Damage to the bull gear and both inboard low speed pinion gears was not observable through the access openings. The final decision was made at that time to lift the casing on number 4 reduction gear.

All redactions are B6

The following morning, 12 July, I talked at some length with the two NIS agents onboard, Mr. _____ and Mr. _____. They had been interviewing all personnel who had been down in number 4 main on 7, 8, and 9 July. During their interviews they also acquired knowledge of cold iron watchstanding practices and procedures in RANGER. They subsequently made a flow diagram showing all personnel who had entered number 4 main during the above period.

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ENCLOSURE (5)

During the interviews, it was brought out that standard practice was for watch standers to awaken their own reliefs and that on occasion unauthorized personnel were permitted in the space. Over the weekend one man had brought his wife and young son down in the space to show them where he worked.

In interviewing the officers and men associated with number four main engine, I discerned that the main emphasis was being placed on safety and prevention of fire and flooding. The thought of a RANGER crewman committing an act of deliberate sabotage was appalling to them.

After the #4 main reduction gear casing was lifted and damage to the bull gear observed, Captain B-6 set a marine guard in the space and ensured two man control of the film and photographs being taken. Primary concern, aside from correcting the damage and preventing further damage to machinery, was in prevention of adverse publicity indicating success or failure of any alleged sabotage.

Upon as complete an investigation as possible without jacking the main gear, it was determined by the General Electric representative that the gears could be repaired in place.

Although I did not specifically investigate the other incidents onboard RANGER, I am aware of them and it would definitely appear that one or more RANGER sailors are embarked on a cause of disrupting the organization and effecting her main propulsion capability.

UNSWORN STATEMENT BY MMI
TAKEN AT 1100, 14 JULY 1972

All reduction
a/c B-6
, USN,

Commencing on Friday at approximately 0900 a complete field day of all machinery as undertaken. This field day was centered mainly on the worst areas of the bulkheads and the larger pieces of machinery, the main turbine and reduction gearing. Some of the crew was helping around the Tool Cage to clear out unnecessary items and remove them from the space. Early liberty was authorized if the space was satisfactory in Ensign _____ opinion.

At about 1200, Ensign _____ arrived in the space and found there to be extensive dirt in the bilges on the starboard side. He signed brow passes for the crew but I held most of them until the worst part of the bilge dirt was cleaned up and finishing touches put on the cleanup of the tool cage area. This was about 1345 or so. The men cleaned up and left the space I am fairly positive by at latest 1430.

At about the time that everyone was gone except myself, LCDR _____ made a routine tour of #4 MMR to check the security of the main engines. He discovered one lock loose and apparently forced on the reduction gearing at which point he called Chief _____ to the space. While the three of us were there, I opened the inspection port and the three of us inspected the part of the gearing which we could see. We saw nothing unusual on this inspection. We discussed inspection of the main sump and decided that safe engineering practice would have to be followed, therefore we began emptying the main sump at about 1600. And I placed a second combination lock on the inspection port.

ENCLOSURE (6)

The sump was empty at about 2100 at which time Mr. and myself inspected the sump, myself entering first. At a location directly under the Bull Gear I found a paint scraper which I handed to Mr. who in turn handed it to Chief who was standing by outside the sump. This was all we located in the sump other than some sermatex-like material.

Work on cleaning the sump began at about 2130 and continued until about 0500. At about 0900, Mr. and myself gave a final inspection to the sump and found it in excellent condition. A small dowel pin had been found during the cleaning.

All redactions are B6.

By 1030 the sump was refilled and ready for operation. At about 1130 Investigators arrived aboard and inspected the area. At this time I exchanged a key type lock for the combination lock and gave both keys to Mr. . The investigators questioned Chief and myself at about 1200 after which I went on liberty.

At 1130 Sunday, they stationed the lighting off watch in #4 MMR. At about 1425 or 1430, I commenced jacking #4 Main Engine in the stern direction. At about 1510, a delay was experienced when a hole was found in #4 deaerating feed tank necessitating securing #4 Main Machinery Room and shifting the watch to #1 Main Machinery Room. I remained on hand to oversee the repair of the Deaerating Feed Tank, which was done and tested at 2400. Being quite tired, I went to sleep on the deck in the control station somewhere around 0030 and woke up for the lighting off watch at about 0330.

Everything went normally during light off and up until testing of main engine at which time a loud metallic clanking came from our reduction gearing. Chief had the throttle and guarding valve secured and inspection by CDR began within about 5 minutes. He discovered damaged teeth and processes were begun to lift the casing for thorough inspection.

All redactions are B-6.

Shop 38 yard workers and shop 72 riggers began preparations for removal of the after starboard quarter of the reduction gear casing. Commanders and along with Mr. and the senior safety officer plus other interested persons were in attendance at the casing lifting. The after end cover was removed first and about an hour later the main quarter starboard side aft. Upon lifting the main casing, Captain and the ship's photographer were in attendance. Five badly broken teeth were discernible on the main bull gear immediately above the LP Low speed upper pinion on the after belix of the bull gear. Also a large stud was wedged between the L.P. Low Speed lower pinion and the bull gear with badly damaged teeth on both bull gear and pinion discernible in this area. Two complete sets of photographs were taken of all these areas from two or three angles.

Marine guards were set around the area for security reasons by order of Captain. As soon as they could be obtained the Tech Rep from G. B. arrived aboard and made his decision as to the degree of damage and recommended repair of existing unit in place.

After removal of the foreign object from the gear train the gears were jacked first by hand then by power to reveal the badly damaged areas. The shaft had already been uncoupled in compartment 7-175-4-E. As soon as materials could be obtained the G. E. Tech Rep began removal of badly burred areas and the casting of hones from epoxy type materials, with the assistance of myself, Chief *B6*, Ensign *B6*. Currently, all assistance requested by the men who are accomplishing repairs is being supplied by ship's company.

UNSWORN STATEMENT BY MMC
TAKEN AT 1100, 14 JULY 1972

, USN,

The last time I had personally visually inspected the padlocks on the reduction gear inspection ports, previous to the incident was approximately 1300-1400 on 30 June 1972. This was not a padlock inspection as such, but sea detail was stationed and during sea detail I checked out the space as does my top watch standers. I checked the lube oil sight flow indicators and bearing temperatures on the main engine and reduction gear and although it was not intended to be a padlock inspection, the locations of the thermometers and indicators are close enough to the locks that I am sure that if a lock was broken at that time that I would have noticed it.

All redactions are B6
On Friday, the 7th of July, at approximately 1500, I was in P-1 Division Office working on PMS schedules when I received a phone call from LCDR [redacted] the MPA. He asked me to come down to the engine room immediately because he had found a broken padlock on the lower aft stbd 2nd reduction pinion gear inspection cover. Upon arriving in #4 MMR, I noted that LCDR [redacted], MM1 [redacted] FN [redacted], and FR [redacted] were at the reduction gear. The lock looked like it had been pried open. The shank that goes into the hole in the lock was bent badly enough that the lock could not be pelocked and the top of the shank where it is "U" shaped had what appeared to be a fresh scratch, the lock was tarnished but the scratch was bright and shiny. The lock when I first

ENCLOSURE (7)

saw it was not in the hole in the bolt on the cover.
LCDR had just opened the cover to inspect the gear
when I arrived. He showed me the lock, and at first I
thought that possibly one of my men had stepped on it and
broken it. MM3 and FN had scrubbed down
the reduction gear that morning. I asked the LCDR if the
threads on the retaining bolt looked as if someone had
loosened the nut. He said that it didn't look like it to
him. While looking thru the port he noted that there was
a bright spot on the side of the gear casing, and suspected
that something had been dropped in. He went to get per-
mission to take #4 main engine out of commission so we could
pump the sump out and go in and look. While he was gone, I
noticed a piece of metal laying on the deck plates just aft
of the reduction gear, this seemed abnormal to me because
field day was held that morning and there should not have
been anything on the deck plates. It was a piece of steel
wedge shaped about 5/8" thick and about a foot long. When
the MPA came back, I gave it to him. He told me to pump
the oil out, so we could inspect the sump. I had
line it up to the settling tank using the electric lube oil
service pump. And about 1530 we started pumping and pumped
the sump dry with it. At about 2000 we opened the sump
and LCDR and MML went in and found the paint
scraper. We then proceeded to clean the sump. LCDR

inspected the reduction gears thru the ports and did

All reductions are B-6

not notice anything else in the gears. The inspection port with the broken lock was locked with a combination lock that *B-6* had until another padlock could be acquired. After the sump was cleaned and filled with oil, the MPA had the gears jacked both forward and astern while he was visually observing them thru the inspection ports. He found nothing the matter at this inspection. At that time, he felt that we had found all that was dropped in the gear and put #4 main engine back in commission. At 1415, Sunday, 9 July 1972, *B-6* engaged the jacking gear in the astern direction in preparation of lighting off the engineering plant. The engine was jacked until about 0730 10 July 1972 when we disengaged the jacking gear to spin the engine. Then before we could spin the engine, central control told us to engage the jacking gear again. I engaged the jacking gear and started it in the forward direction. I got a crowsfoot and put it on the gear in various places and listened for any unusual noises. I noted no unusual noise. Then central control told us to disengage the jacking gear and spin. This was about 0740, 10 July 1972. I disengaged the jacking gear and signaled the throttleman, FN *B-6*, to spin the engine. I was standing aft of the reduction gear and on this first spin noted nothing unusual. The shaft turned about 3/4 of one turn in the astern direction. I then signalled the throttleman to spin again and immediately heard a loud metallic noise. I immediately signalled the throttleman to stop the shaft. I then engaged the jacking gear and locked the shaft with the locking device, closed

the guarding valve and called the Chief Engineer. The Chief Engineer and MPA arrived immediately and simultaneously, they unlocked the inspection covers and had me unlock the shaft and bump the jacking gear. On the first or second bump we heard a loud metallic noise and something drop through the gears and land in the sump. Also, they noted tooth damage to the Ball Gear. We commenced pumping the oil out of the sump and had pumped about 300 gallons when the electric lube oil pump bound up and we had to finish pumping the sump with the lube oil purifier. While this was progressing, I was instructed to uncouple the shaft and for the next 36 hours I was in the stern tube section of the shaft alley uncoupling the shaft. I was not present when the reduction gear covers were removed. MM1 *R/L* was present as was the Chief Engineer and MPA.

During inport periods the duty section works until 2200 on workday and all day Saturdays and Sundays until 1600, except when taking bilge soundings and fresh and feed water soundings as necessary. The cold iron watch stands his watch in the control booth where he has communications with Central Control. From that booth he cannot adequately observe everyone who enters the space.

The cold iron watches are assigned by the P-1 Division Officer and are not always personnel who are assigned to that space. Therefore the watchstanders do not always recognize the men who are authorized in the space.

If enough people were available, would recommend a cold iron watch in the space and a watch in the access ladder to control access to the space. So many men other than P-1 Division have business in 4 Main Engineering Space, including electricians, R Division personnel, etc., that it is impossible to recognize everyone who is authorized in the space.

I need about 25 men to properly run the space and I now have 18. I do not have enough people to maintain the space and am hurting in experienced Petty Officers.

On Friday 7 July 1972, the broken lock was found and subsequent inspection revealed the paint scraper in the sump. Visual inspection through the access port did not reveal any further foreign objects. It is significant that the ports are positioned to inspect the oil nozzles and are not conveniently located to thoroughly inspect the gears. The after upper port is positioned directly over the second reduction low speed pinion and is too small to permit visual inspection of all gears.

The positioning of the scraper and studs appears that they were positioned to avoid detection and possibly the scraper was dropped into the sump to draw attention away from the studs. The studs had to be placed carefully at arm's length to their position on the gears.

The cold iron watchstanders were qualified for their duties.

Summary of unsworn statement of Commander
Chief Engineer in USS RANGER (CVA-61).

2, 6, USN,

1. RANGER is presently in refresher training. During the week of 4 July 1972 the schedule called for RANGER to depart Alameda on Wednesday 5 July, conduct refresher training on Thursday 6 July and then moor alongside San Diego on the weekend of 8-9 July 72. In order to accomplish uncompleted Hunter's Point Naval Shipyard guaranteed jobs and to grant well deserved liberty, the decision was made and permission granted to remain in Alameda and go cold iron until getting underway for San Diego on Monday 10 July.
2. RANGER went cold iron on Friday 30 June 72. We lit off the first plant on 8 July in preparation for underway on the 10th and the second plant on the ninth.
3. In order to grant liberty to deserving petty officers, maximum effort was made to grant such liberty resulting in minimum talent being retained onboard to stand cold iron watches. During previous underway periods everyone other than top watches were on port and starboard. This routine plus frequent general quarters for refresher training and normal casualties that occur after a shipyard overhaul resulted in many long hours of work and the people were tired. They deserved a well earned rest.
4. My major concern on security following shipyard overhaul was flooding and fire. RANGER had been in drydock for a lengthy period and susceptible to possible flooding and the Navy distillate conversion required additional fire security. A third concern is general overall safety items.
5. As far as security measures against demonstrations, etc., were concerned our effort was directed toward external security. Known SOS people are kept under close surveillance and are usually multiple offenders. A conscientious effort has been made to control these people. In general the engineers have not fit into this category. The one or two who did are being or have been administratively discharged.
6. As far as the cold iron watchstanders, in retrospect I don't know of any changes that could have been made in personnel assignments that could have precluded this incident.
7. Personnel problems onboard RANGER are compounding other problems now and will for sometime to come. One is the present bureau policy of designating strikers seven weeks out of recruit training and then EPDOPAC counting them as PO3, and the other is the fact that after an eleven month overhaul the firemen who have been onboard for that period have had no steaming experience. Formulating an adequate watch bill when considering these factors has presented serious problems.

08158

ENCLOSURE (8)

Summary of unsworn statement of Commander ^{B-6}
, USN, Executive Officer, USS RANGER (CVA-61) taken
at 0820, 13 July 1972.

1. The security of RANGER has been primarily oriented toward protection against external acts of sabotage, demonstrations, etc. The capability to resist these actions is considered excellent.
2. Internal security presents different problems. To prevent incidents such as this case, internal security patrols over and above departmental security patrols were established at the commencement of the yard period some twelve months ago for inport periods and since the incident the patrols have been carried out while underway. In addition a survey has been made to ascertain those areas that are vulnerable, i.e. not manned or have less than two men actually at work. Spaces that can be locked have been identified and the security forces are tasked to check these locks regularly. These security patrols are in addition to the regular departmental watches and the Master at Arms force. Locking spaces must be judiciously controlled so as not to interfere with damage control and fire-fighting capability.
3. I believe that the system presently in use and being perfected to be the best compromise between operating the ship and maintaining adequate security. Main problem is in identifying those personnel who are not authorized to be in a particular space, for example authorized maintenance personnel are doing required work throughout the ship at all hours.
4. The Master at Arms force in RANGER exceeds that required by Ship's Manning Document but is still considered inadequate. Sixteen men (16) in a ship this size cannot provide required security during inport liberty hours with 4 to 6 section watches. At present 21 men are assigned. 50 percent are volunteers and about 25 percent who have had some police training, including the Chief Master at Arms who is a graduate of the Army Criminal Investigation Course, Fort Gordon, Georgia. The fact that the MAA force in the Navy is not a professionally trained security force results in less than adequate capability. The only professional training RANGER has been able to obtain is from the Oakland and Hayward Police Academies on an as available basis. The emphasis of the training received at these academies is on routine investigative procedures and drug detection techniques. Aside from that training is limited to on-the-job training conducted by MAA personnel who are fortunate enough to attend these academies and by other qualified personnel such as the Medical Officer, Legal Officer, and NIS Agents.

08158

ENCLOSURE (9)

5. RANGER Has made a point of maintaining contact with local NISO Officers and to date we have no known RANGER crewmen actively participating in the SOS movement or any other clandestine organization.

6. All identified or suspected drug users are kept under close surveillance by both the MAA and Division Officers and Petty Officers and the Drug Exemption Officer.

End of statement

Unsworn statement of MM2

7-6

, USN.

1. There are too many accesses to the main engineering spaces for one man to adequately cover the entire space. The cold iron watch has the responsibility to identify everyone who comes down into the space.
2. It would be good to have a booklet or some other handout to indoctrinate new men. We are at a point in training where everything is learned as we go.
3. I've been onboard for about 9 weeks and the turnover is such that we have a lot of unqualified men onboard.
4. It would shock me to find out that anyone in our main had damaged that gear. It could definitely be done by someone other than 4 main gang. The gear job and the feed flow regulator damage proves the culprit is knowledgeable. The damage to fire fighting gear scares me - we could be in a lot of trouble.
5. Sometimes we have a procedure where we get a program from the Chief and then someone else in the chain comes down and enters senseless stuff directly into the program. We are trying to fix our main so it is the best - I think by INSURV time we will be up there. People get pretty upset with this. This Chief we have is definitely a good Chief - he won't let anybody foul us up as long as we're doing it right.

End of statement.

08158

ENCLOSURE (10)

Unsworn statement of Ensign
Officer

RB

, P-1 Division

1. The space in question, number four main machinery room (as with all other propulsion spaces in Engineering) has two ladders and four escape trunk accesses, two on each level, By surrounding the area with a security blanket complete control of who enters these spaces might be practical.
2. The cold iron watchstanders have basically been instructed and have the function of fire and flood detection and protection. Policing the spaces for unauthorized personnel has not been a specific task of the cold iron watch. So many men are authorized in the space it would be most difficult to determine who is authorized and who is not.
3. Specific duties are frequently required of the cold iron watch which requires communication with Central Control. To maintain contact with Central Control to react to emergencies the man must be immediately reachable and therefore stand his watch in the Console Booth. This requirement could be modified to permit his patrolling the space with a loud horn or claxon to call him for emergencies.
4. Visible contact with the main engine that was tampered with is possible if the man is standing and specifically looking in that direction. Sound-proofing of the console booth deadens any sound. Extreme risks would be taken, however, in carrying out the act of tampering with the booth manned since he could easily be observed from the booth and would have little opportunity to escape if detected.
5. One area of concern is that the cold iron watch does not always notify central when he leaves the space to go to the head or to wake up his relief. This is being corrected.
6. Three other things that effect security has been the lack of stern disciplinary action on offenses which are related to negligent watchstanding and the lack of communication between division officers and top command. Therefore the cold iron watch could be considered quite lax and could effect security. Undermanning and long hours which result in decreased effectiveness of watchstanders can be considered a contributor to this event and could result in future casualties.
7. For a period, (2 months) immediately prior to the incident second and third class petty officers were standing cold iron watches. This was due to the departure of some during their duty nights. A few days prior to the incident at their behest

08158

ENCLOSURE (11)

and assurance that they would take the responsibility I removed this onus. I don't feel that this in itself was a factor unless BT2 *B.V.* (one of the highly indignant POs) is found to be the culprit. But to my mind that possibility is dim indeed.

MAIN MACHINERY ROOM NO. 4 - UPPER LEVEL


	Quantity
1. Lubricating oil storage tank	4
2. Deaerating feed tank	1
3. Port use forced draft blower (motor)	2
4. Boiler	2
5. Boiler chemical feed tank	1
6. Desuperheater	1
7. Forced draft blower (turbine)	6
8. Lubricating oil settling tank	1
9. Fuel oil inspection tank	1
10. Fuel oil heater	4
11. Reduction gear	1
12. Gland leak-off exhauster fan (100 CFM)	2
13. Gland leak-off condenser (auxiliary)	1
14. Air preheater	2
15. High pressure and intermediate pressure turbine	1
16. Low pressure turbine	1
17. Boiler control air compressor	2
18. Air receiver for boiler control air compressor	1
19. Ship's service turbo-generator condenser air ejector	1
20. Main air ejector	1
21. Operating station - for typical arrangement see fig. 2-8	1
22. Gland leak-off exhauster fan (300 CFM)	1
23. Ship's service turbo-generator (1500 KW)	1

MAIN MACHINERY ROOM NO. 4 - LOWER LEVEL


	Quantity
1. Shaft #1	1
2. Main feed booster pump (turbine)	2
3. Main feed booster pump (motor)	1
4. Emergency feed booster pump and reserve feed transfer pump (motor)	1
5. Emergency feed booster and reserve feed transfer priming pump	1
6. Emergency diesel salt water booster pump	1
7. Deaerating feed tank	1
8. Port use forced draft blower (connection)	2
9. Boiler	2
10. Lubricating oil service pump (turbine)	1
11. Reduction gear	1
12. Main fuel oil service pump (turbine)	3
13. Lubricating oil service pump (motor)	1
14. Lubricating oil service pump (attached)	1
15. Auxiliary machinery cooling water pump	1
16. Steady bearing	1
17. Lubricating oil purifier	1
18. Lubricating oil strainer	1

MAIN MACHINERY ROOM NO. 4 - LOWER LEVEL (CONT'D)

	Quantity
19. Main condenser	1
20. Lubricating oil cooler	1
21. Feed water recirculating control panel	1
22. Main feed pump (turbine)	3
23. Feed water control panel	1
24. Fuel oil coolers	2
26. Port use fuel oil service pump (motor)	1
27. Ship's service turbo-generator condenser circulating water pump	1
28. Fresh water drain collecting tank and pumps	1 tank, 2 pumps
29. Contaminated drain tank	1
30. Fire pump (turbine)	1
31. Lubricating oil cooler (main thrust bearing)	1
32. Main thrust bearing	1
33. Ship's service turbo-generator condenser	1
34. Main condenser condensate pump (motor)	1
35. Main condenser condensate pump (turbine)	1
36. Main ejection scoop	1
37. Main condenser circulation water pump	1
38. Ship's service turbo-generator condenser condensate pump	1
39. Bilge and fuel oil stripping pump	1



PLAN, UPPER LEVEL



PLAN, LOWER LEVEL

1213 MAIN MACHINERY ROOM NO. 4
FIGURE 2-4

F-3 DIVISION
OIL LAB (IN PORT)
THREE SECTION

I

II

III

I

II

III

IV

ACC SHOP

I

II

III

IV

BR SHOP

I

II

III

IV

TWO MEN IN OIL LAB AT ALL TIMES
ONE MAN IN BR/ACC SHOP TILL 2200
(24 HOUR CALL FOR ACC OR BR SHOP)
TWO MEN ON DONUT WATCH
TWO MEN IN CENTRAL (SUPERVISOR OF WATCH)
ONE MAN PPO/DCPO
WORKING PARTIES/SHORE PATROL AS NEEDED

*All reductions
are B 6*

08158

ENCLOSURE (13)

BT TOP
BOARD
AUX
CHECKS
BURNERS
MESS
SMY

MM TOP
GEN
GEN
FEED P.
MESS
SHAFT A.

COLD IRON

FIRE PARTY P-1
 P-2

RESCUE AND ASSISTANCE

DONUT

BRAVO WORKING PARTY

CHARLIE WORKING PARTY

All redactions are
B-G

TYPE SECTION TWO
INPORT STEERING

BT TOP
BOARD
AUX
CHECKS
BURNERS
MESSENGER
SMOKEY

MM TOP
GENERATOR
GENERATOR
FEED PMP
MESSENGER
SHAFT ALLEY

COLD IRON

FIRE PARTY P-1: :
P-2: :

RESCUE & ASSISTANCE:

DOWNY :

ERA VO WORKING PARTY:

CHARLIE WORKING PARTY:

All redactions
are B-6

DEPT SECTION THREE
IMPORT STEERING

BT TOP
BOARD
AUX
CHECKS
BURNERS
MESSENGER
SMOKEY

MM TOP
GENERATOR
GENERATOR
FEED PMP
MESSENGER
SHAFT ALLEY

COLD IRON

FIRE PARTY: P-1: :
P-2: :

RESCUE & ASSISTANCE:

DOGGETT :

BRAVO WORKING PARTY:

CHARLIE WORKING PARTY:

*All redactions
are B-G.*

DUTY SECTION ONE
INFANT STEERING

BT TOP
BOARD
AUX
CHECKS
BURNERS
MESSENGER
SMOKEY

MM TOP
FEED PMP
GENERATOR
GENERATOR+
MESSENGER
SH. FT ALLEY

COLD IRON

FIRE PARTY: P-1:
P-2:

RESCUE & ASSIST NOE:

DONUT :

BRAVO WORKING PARTY :

CHARLIE WORKING PARTY:

*are All redactions
B G.*

DUTY SECTION TWO
IMPORT STRAINING

ET TOP
BOARD
AUX
CHECKS
BURNERS
MESSENGER
SMOKEY

MM TOP
FEED PMP
GENERATOR
GENERATOR
MESSENGER
SHAFT ALLEY

COLD IRON

FIRE PARTY: P-1:
P-2:

DONUT :

RESCUE & ASSISTANCE:

BRAVO WORKING PARTY:

CHARLIE WORKING PARTY:

All redactions
are B-6

DUTY SECTION 101
INJECT STEERING

BT TOP
BOARD
AUX
CHECKS
BURNERS
MES. ENGER
SMOKEY

MM TOP
FEED PMP
GENERATOR
GENERATOR
MES. ENGER
SHAFT ALLEY

COLD IRON

FIRE PARTY: P-1 :
P-2 :

RESCUE & ASSISTANCE:

DONUT :

BRAVO WORKING PARTY:

CHARLIE WORKING PARTY:

All redactions
are B.6.

DUTY SECTION FOUR
IMPORT STRAINING

BT TOP
BOARD
AUX
CHECKS
BURNERS
MESSENGER
SLOKEY

MM TOP
FEED PMP
GENERATOR
GENERATOR
MESSENGER
SHAFT ALLEY

COLD IRON

FIRE PARTY: P-1:
P-2:

RESCUE & ASSISTANCE :

DONUT :

BRAVO WORKING PARTY:

CHARLIE WORKING PARTY:

All redactions
are B-6.

21 JUNE 72

From: Personnel Officer
To: Commanding Officer
Via: (1) Administrative Officer
(2) Executive Officer

Subj: Personnel on board's breakdown by rate of

Encl: (1) Listing of breakdown by rate

1. The breakdown by rate is as of 19 JUNE 72. Enclosure (1) shows the Enlisted Distribution Plan (EDP), Current/July Allowance, personnel on board June, on board August, and on board October 1972, including losses and gains during those months.

Very respectfully,

B/b CWO, USN
PERSONNEL OFFICER

08153

ENCLOSURE (4)

<u>RATE</u>	<u>END</u>	<u>CURRENT/ JUL ALB</u>	<u>ONBD</u>	<u>ONED AUG</u>	<u>ONED OCTOBER</u>
BNCB	1	3/3	0	0	0
BNCB	1	1/1	1	1	1
BNC	1	3/2	2	2	2
BND	10	5/10	7	5	5
BNE	21	18/22	17	17	17
BNE	26/	23/26	17	24	17
BNSM	2	8/0	0	0	0
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>67/63</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>42</u>
BNCB	1	1/1	0	0	0
BNCB	0	0/0	1	00	0
BND	1	2/2	2	2	2
BNE	3	3/3	4	3	3
BNE	3	4/4	7	4	4
BNSM	7	1/5	2	2	2
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>11/15</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>
BNCB	1	1/1	1	1	1
BND	2	3/3	3	3	3
BNE	3	1/3	3	3	3
BNE	3	4/6	5	5	5
BNSM	2	0/6	0	0	0
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11/19</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>
BNCB	1	1/2	1	1	1
BNC	2	6/3	2	2	2
BND	3	11/10	5	3	3
BNE	4	14/8	7	6	6
BNE	20	6/17	22	15	15
BNSM	23	18/17	17	15	15
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>48/71</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>50</u>
BNCB	1	1/1	1	1	1
BNC	0	1/1	0	0	0
BND	0	7/2	1	0	0
BNE	0	1/3	1	1	1
BNE	2	4/5	1	1	1
BNSM	2	2/3	1	1	1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2/15</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>

Enclosure 11

08153

RATE	EDP	CURRENT/ JULY ALU	GNB	GNB	AUGUST	GNB	OCT
GNCR	1	1/1	0	0	1	1	1
GNCC	1	1/1	1	1	1	1	1
GNCC	1	1/1	0	0	0	0	0
GNCC	1	1/1	0	0	0	0	0
GNTC	2	2/2	2	2	2	2	2
GNTI	2	2/2	3	3	3	3	3
GNGI	4	3/4	4	4	4	4	4
GNTR	11	5/6	11	11	11	11	11
GNCR	1	5/5	2	2	2	2	2
GNTR	4	7/7	4	4	4	4	4
GNCR	5	5/5	5	5	5	5	5
GNTRSN	4	7/7	3	3	3	3	3
GNCRSN	1	1/1	1	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	59	48/50	60	60	49	49	49
PTCR	1	1/1	0	0	0	0	0
PTCC	1	1/1	1	1	1	1	1
PTGI	2	2/2	1	1	1	1	1
PTGB	2	2/2	1	1	1	1	1
PTGB	2	2/2	1	1	1	1	1
PTGFH	2	2/2	1	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	10	15/10	5	5	5	5	5
ETCR	1	1/1	1	1	1	1	1
ETCS	1	0/0	1	1	1	1	1
ETC	2	2/2	2	2	2	2	2
ETI	2	2/2	2	2	2	2	2
ETNB	14	7/8	14	14	14	14	14
ETRE	5	5/7	5	5	5	5	5
ETNB	12	7/6	12	12	12	12	12
ETRB	11	5/5	11	11	11	11	11
ETNSN	2	2/2	2	2	2	2	2
ETRSN	1	1/1	1	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	56	48/37	69	69	75	77	77

Enclosure 113

<u>RATE</u>	<u>EDF</u>	<u>CURR/JUL ALW</u>	<u>ONED</u>	<u>ONED ADG</u>	<u>ONED BCT</u>
DSCS	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
DSC	1	2 / 2	0	0	0
DS1	4	6 / 3	3	3	3
DS2	10	11 / 10	16	14	14
DS3	6	5 / 6	2	3	3
DSSN	2	0 / 2	1	1	1
TOTAL	23	24 / 23	23	22	22
IM2	0	0 / 1	0	0	0
IM3	2	2 / 1	0	0	0
IMSN	0	0 / 0	2	2	2
TOTAL	2	2 / 2	2	2	2
MMCM	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
MMCS	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
MM1	2	3 / 2	4	4	4
MM1	3	7 / 7	5	6	6
MM2	19	9 / 17	11	10	10
MM3	23	5 / 24	22	23	27
MMSN	30	11 / 29	12	24	24
TOTAL	80	36 / 80	55	68	72
YNCS	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
YNC	0	1 / 0	2	2	2
YN1	2	4 / 3	5	4	4
YN2	4	6 / 9	1	1	1
YN3	13	9 / 12	16	16	15
CYN3	0	5 / 0	8	8	8
YNSN	2	6 / 3/	4	5	5
CYNSN	0	14 / 0	3	4	4
TOTAL	22	46 / 28	39	40	39
PMCM	0	1 / 0	1	1	1
PMCS	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
PNC	1	1 / 1	0	1	1
PN1	1	3 / 1	2	2	2
PN2	3	4 / 5	4	3	2
PN3	6	8 / 8	10	11	11
PNSN	9	6 / 10	6	9	10
TOTAL	21	24 / 26	23	27	27

Enclosure (1)

<u>RATE</u>	<u>EDP</u>	<u>CURR/JUL ALW</u>	<u>ONBD</u>	<u>ONBD AUG</u>	<u>ONBD OCT</u>
DPC	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
DP1	2	3 / 2	3	3	2
DP2	5	4 / 5	4	3	5
DP3	6	2 / 6	8	6	6
DPSN	11	7 / 11	5	6	6
TOTAL	25	17 / 25	20	19	20
SKCM	1	0 / 1	0	0	0
SKCS	0	1 / 0	1	1	1
SKC	2	2 / 2	1	2	2
SK1	6	6 / 7	3	5	5
SK2	5	9 / 7	4	8	3
SK3	14	9 / 12	11	10	10
SKSN	1	2 / 0	3	3	3
TOTAL	29	29 / 22	23	24	24
DKC	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
DK1	2	2 / 2	2	2	2
DK2	1	2 / 2	1	2	2
DK3	5	2 / 4	5	3	3
DKSN	0	1 / 1	0	3	4
TOTAL	9	8 / 10	9	11	12
CSCS	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
CSC	1	2 / 2	3	3	3
CS1	5	7 / 10	5	4	4
CS2	7	12 / 12	11	13	12
CS3	11	14 / 16	9	7	7
CSSN	4	2 / 0	6	5	4
TOTAL	29	38 / 41	34	32	30
SHCS	1	1 / 1	2	1	1
SHC	2	1 / 2	1	1	1
SH1	5	3 / 7	4	3	3
SH2	5	10 / 8	4	6	6
SH3	9	15 / 15	14	15	15
SHSN	0	2 / 1	0	0	0
TOTAL	22	32 / 34	25	26	26

Enclosure (1)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EDF</u>	<u>CURR/JUL</u>	<u>GNED</u>	<u>ONEAL AUG</u>	<u>GNBU OCT</u>
J01	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
J02	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
J03	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
J0SN	1	0 / 1	0	1	1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2 / 3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
PCCS	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
PCC	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
PC1	0	1 / 1	0	0	0
PC2	2	2 / 2	0	0	0
PC3	1	1 / 3	2	3	3
PCSN	0	0 / 0	0	1	1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5 / 7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
LI1	1	1 / 11	1	1	0
LI2	1	1 / 1	0	0	1
LI3	2	1 / 2	1	1	1
LISN	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
<u>TOTAL</u>					
DM2	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
DM3	0	0 / 0	0	1	1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1 / 1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
SN	354	501 / 460	367	403	394

ENCLOSURE (1)

<u>RATE</u>	<u>EDP</u>	<u>CURRENT/ JUL ALW</u>	<u>ONBD</u>	<u>ONBD AUG</u>	<u>ONBD OCT</u>
MMCM	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
MMCS	0	0 / 1	2	2	2
MMC	5	10 / 5	7	7	7
MM1	15	23 / 17	22	21	21
MM2	31	36 / 31	18	21	22
MM3	42	46 / 28	55	52	52
MMFN	13	4 / 10	20	20	20
	<u>107</u>	<u>120 / 103</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>124</u>
ENC	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
EN1	1	2 / 1	1	1	1
EN2	2	3 / 3	2	1	1
EN3	7	7 / 5	15	15	15
ENFN	0	0 / 0	2	6	6
	<u>11</u>	<u>13 / 10</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>24</u>
MRC	1	1 / 0	2	1	1
MR1	1	1 / 1	1	2	1
MR2	3	3 / 2	5	3	0
MR3	5	4 / 4	3	3	3
MRFN	1	0 / 0	3	3	3
	<u>11</u>	<u>9 / 7</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>8</u>
BTCM	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
BPCS	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
BTC	3	5 / 5	5	4	5
BT1	6	12 / 13	11	12	12
BT2	25	25 / 25	18	16	11
BT3	29	38 / 38	33	27	27
BTFN	31	29 / 29	22	35	34
	<u>95</u>	<u>111 / 111</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>90</u>
BRC	0	0 / 0	0	1	1
BRC	1	1 / 1	1	0	0
BRL	1	1 / 0	0	0	0
	<u>2</u>	<u>2 / 1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
EMCM	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
EMCS	1	1 / 1	2	2	2
EMC	2	6 / 3	3	3	3
EM1	8	13 / 9	10	8	8
EM2	23	23 / 19	19	19	17
EM3	32	40 / 36	41	47	45
EMFN	11	4 / 16	11	11	10
	<u>78</u>	<u>88 / 85</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>86</u>

<u>rate</u>	<u>EDP</u>	<u>CURRENT/ JUL ALW</u>	<u>ONBD</u>	<u>ONBD AUG</u>	<u>ONBD OCT</u>
ICC	0	1 / 1	2	2	2
IC1	1	6 / 5	3	2	2
IC2	3	10 / 9	8	7	8
IC3	13	13 / 18	13	12	10
ICFN	6	9 / 5	4	4	4
	<u>23</u>	<u>39 / 38</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>26</u>
HTCM	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
HTCS	0	0 / 1	0	0	0
HTC	4	4 / 2	5	6	6
HT1	4	7 / 6	3	3	3
HT2	20	23 / 14	19	14	10
HT3	15	15 / 43	36	34	27
HTFN	2	2 / 0	14	14	14
	<u>46</u>	<u>52 / 67</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>60</u>
FN	231	215 / 231	163	160	154

<u>RATE</u>	<u>EDP</u>	<u>CURT/TUL</u> <u>AM</u>	<u>ONED</u>	<u>ONED</u> <u>AUG</u>	<u>ONED</u> <u>OCT</u>
<u>AFCM</u>	2	1 / 2	1	1	1
<u>AVCM</u>	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
<u>ADCS</u>	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
<u>ADRC</u>	0	0 / 0	1	0	0
<u>ADJC</u>	2	1 / 2	6	0	0
<u>ADRI</u>	1	1 / 2	0	0	1
<u>ADH2</u>	6	2 / 5	1	1	2
<u>ADJ1</u>	0	2 / 5	1	1	2
<u>ADRS</u>	0	1 / 0	5	5	4
<u>ADJS</u>	0	0 / 1	2	3	2
<u>ADRAN</u>	0	0 / 0	3	3	3
<u>ADJAN</u>	0	2 / 0	4	3	3
<u>TOTAL</u>	10	10 / 12	18	17	17
<u>ATCS</u>	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
<u>ATC</u>	4	1 / 4	1	2	3
<u>AT1</u>	4	5 / 7	4	4	4
<u>AT2</u>	12	8 / 13	6	5	3
<u>AT3</u>	6	4 / 6	7	7	6
<u>ATAN</u>	2	1 / 2	2	3	2
<u>TOTAL</u>	29	20 / 33	20	21	18
<u>AOCSS</u>	1	1 / 1	2	2	2
<u>AOC</u>	5	5 / 5	5	6	6
<u>AO1</u>	5	9 / 10	5	5	6
<u>AO2</u>	15	15 / 15	15	15	15
<u>AO3</u>	37	31 / 32	37	36	24
<u>AOAN</u>	21	36 / 35	19	26	25
<u>TOTAL</u>	84	69 / 97	84	90	106
<u>AQCS</u>	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
<u>AQC</u>	1	2 / 1	0	0	0
<u>AQ1</u>	2	3 / 5	1	1	1
<u>AQ2</u>	7	6 / 5	3	3	3
<u>AQ3</u>	7	1 / 7	2	4	5
<u>AQAN</u>	1	0 / 1	0	1	1
<u>TOTAL</u>	19	13 / 19	7	10	11
<u>ACCS</u>	1	1 / 1	1	0	1
<u>ACC</u>	1	1 / 1	2	2	2
<u>AC1</u>	3	4 / 4	3	4	4
<u>AC2</u>	5	8 / 9	9	8	7
<u>AC3</u>	5	4 / 1	2	2	2
<u>ACAN</u>	1	4 / 1	2	2	2
<u>TOTAL</u>	16	23 / 21	19	18	18

Enclosure (1)

<u>RAFF</u>	<u>EDF</u>	<u>JUN/JUL AIN</u>	<u>ONED</u>	<u>ONED AUG</u>	<u>ONED OCT</u>
AGCS	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
AG1	2	2 / 2	3	3	3
AG2	3	2 / 3	4	4	4
ag3	4	3 / 5	4	4	4
AGAN	2	3 / 2	1	4	4
TOTAL	12	14 / 15	13	16	16
TD1	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
TD2	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
TDAN	1	0 / 1	0	0	0
TOTAL	1	0 / 1	2	2	2
AKCM	0	1 / 0	0	0	0
AKCS	1	0 / 1	1	1	1
AKC	2	1 / 2	2	2	2
AK1	5	6 / 7	4	4	5
AK2	13	10 / 14	10	10	10
AK3	9	10 / 6	15	16	16
AKAN	8	2 / 6	1	7	7
TOTAL1	38	30 / 38	33	40	41
AEC5	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
AEC	2	1 / 2	1	1	1
AE1	0	2 / 1	0	0	0
AE2	3	1 / 4	0	0	0
AE3	8	3 / 8	6	4	4
AEAN	0	1 / 1	2	5	5
TOTAL	14	9 / 17	10	11	11
ASCS	1	1 / 1	2	2	2
ASC	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
AS1	3	3 / 3	5	5	6
ASE2	1	2 / 1	2	2	2
ASH2	2	2 / 2	3	3	4
ASM2	2	3 / 3	2	1	1
ASE3	2	3 / 2	1	1	1
ASH3	2	3 / 2	2	2	1
ASM3	2	6 / 3	3	3	3
ASEAN	1	1 / 1	1	2	3
ASHAN	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
ASMAN	1	2 / 2	1	2	2
TOTAL	19	28 / 22	23	24	26

Enclosure (1)

DATE	EDF	RA/JUL ASW	ONBD	ONBD AUG	ONBD OCT
ABCM	1	1 / 1	1	1	0
ABCS	1	1 / 1	1	1	2
ABEC	3	3 / 1	1	2	2
ABFC	3	2 / 3	2	2	2
ABHC	4	4 / 2	6	5	6
ABE1	6	9 / 7	6	8	11
ABF1	5	5 / 5	5	5	5
ABH1	8	9 / 9	9	9	9
ABE2	8	14 / 15	7	8	7
ABF2	7	9 / 11	11	9	8
ABH2	9	13 / 12	7	10	14
ABE3	27	17 / 21	22	19	17
ABH3	17	12 / 19	12	14	15
ABE3	27	19 / 25	19	24	26
ABEAN	13	30 / 30	19	20	20
ABFAN	17	0 / 30	1	5	5
ABHAN	12	0 / 7	6	16	19
TOTAL	168	148 / 204	125	158	170
AEC	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
AEL	2	3 / 3	3	3	3
AE2	6	5 / 8	2	6	6
AE3	2	1 / 1	3	2	3
AEAN	0	1 / 1	1	1	1
TOTAL	11	11 / 14	9	12	13
AMCS	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
AMSC	1	0 / 1	1	1	1
AMHC	1	0 / 1	0	0	0
AMS1	1	2 / 2	0	2	2
AMH1	1	1 / 2	0	0	0
AMS2	3	2 / 2	3	2	2
AMH2	1	2 / 2	0	0	0
AME2	1	1 / 1	2	2	1
AMS3	0	1 / 0	3	2	1
AMH3	2	0 / 1	4	5	4
AMSAN	1	1 / 1	2	1	1
AMHAN	1	0 / 2	0	0	0
TOTAL	14	11 / 16	16	16	13
PRC	0	1 / 0	0	1	1
PR11	1	0 / 1	0	0	0
PR2	1	1 / 1	1	1	0
PR3	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
PRAN	0	1 / 0	0	0	0
TOTAL	2	3 / 2	2	3	2

Enclosure (1)

<u>RATE</u>	<u>EDP</u>	<u>CURR/JUL ALW</u>	<u>ONED</u>	<u>ONBD AUG</u>	<u>ONBDOCT</u>
PHCE	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
PHC	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
PH1	4	3 / 4	4	5	5
PH2	4	4 / 6	2	4	5
PH3	6	4 / 7	5	5	6
PEAN	5	0 / 2	4	8	8
TOTAL	21	13 / 21	17	24	26
PTC	1	1 / 1	0	1	1
PT1	1	1 / 2	1	1	2
PT3	4	0 / 3	0	3	3
PT2	3	4 / 4	1	3	3
PEAN	0	0 / 2	1	4	4
TOTAL	9	6 / 12	3	12	13
AN	206	320 / 245	269	340	328

Enclosure (1)

STATE	EDP	OWBR/JUL ALW	ONBL	ONBD AUG	ONBD OCT
HMCM	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
HMCS	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
HMC	1	1 / 1	0	1	1
HME1	3	4 / 4	4	4	5
HM2	6	5 / 5	6	4	4
HME	6	10 / 6	7	9	9
HN	5	7 / 9	3	5	7
TOTAL	21	28 / 26	21	24	27
DTIC	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
DT1	1	1 / 1	1	1	1
DT2	2	2 / 2	2	2	2
DT3	2	1 / 3	4	4	5
DN	3	2 / 4	0	0	0
TOTAL	9	7 / 11	8	8	8
SDCM	1	1 / 1	0	0	0
SDCS	0	0 / 0	1	1	1
SDC	1	2 / 1	2	2	2
SD1	5	3 / 5	5	5	5
SD2	10	10 / 10	13	13	13
SD3	14	13 / 14	13	12	12
TN	29	50 / 39	27	24	24
TOTAL	60	81 / 73	61	60	60
GRAND TOTAL	2393	2511 / 2596	2277	2504	2481

Enclosure (1)

NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.1B

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Internal Security of the Ship

Ref: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1948
(b) U.S. Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter

1. Purpose. To assign responsibilities and establish procedures for the maintenance of the internal security of this vessel.

2. Cancellation. AIRLANT/AIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.1A

3. Objectives. "Internal Security" includes all practices, precautions, and safeguards employed to prevent unauthorized individuals or parties from gaining access to classified matter or equipment, to prevent sabotage, and to prevent instigation of deliberate acts harmful to the ship and its embarked personnel or equipment.

4. Scope. This Instruction encompasses suitable defensive measures against the theft, espionage, unauthorized observation, sabotage of ship's equipment.

5. Responsibilities.

a. The Weapons Officer is hereby designated the Ship's Security Officer, he shall be assisted by the Commanding Officer of the Marine Detachment (when embarked) as required, and shall be responsible for:

(1) Making recommendations to the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer, and Heads of Departments of this vessel regarding the practices, precautions, and safeguarding of equipment and classified matter.

(2) Cooperating with the Classified Material Control Officer and providing assistance, when required, in matters concerning security of classified material.

b. The Commanding Officer shall designate a Classified Material Control Officer who shall be responsible for all matters concerning the security of classified material.

c. Department Heads are charged with the security of all equipment and classified matter under their cognizance, and for the indoctrination of departmental personnel in security precautions, practices, and safeguards.

d. Implementation of Security Measures. To implement security measures cognizant Heads of Departments shall establish roving patrols, sentry posts, duty officers, integrity watches, or other means as enumerated in applicable departmental security instructions. The Master-at-Arms Force shall make periodic patrols of the entire ship to insure that security measures are being properly employed.

ENCLOSURE (15)

1 DEC 1971

6. Standard Security Practices, Precautions, and Safeguards.

a. Prior to being allowed access to the ship, all persons must be identified by the Officer of the Deck or his representative by the means indicated in this Instruction. Any case of doubtful identity shall be reported to the Executive Officer or Command Duty Officer. As long as doubt exists measures shall be taken to deny freedom of movement and access to classified matter or equipment.

(1) Naval Personnel. All officer and enlisted personnel shall be identified on arrival or departure before leaving the vicinity of the Quarterdeck by one of the following means:

- (a) Personal recognition by the Officer of the Deck or his representative.
- (b) Armed Forces Identification Card.

(2) Navy Yard Workmen. Navy Yard Workmen shall be identified by the Officer of the Deck checking their Navy Yard badge and photograph.

(3) Visitor and Guests. Visitors and guests shall be identified by means directed by a separate Instruction concerning the policies and procedures for the handling of visitors and guests.

(4) Tradesmen. The handling of civilian personnel coming aboard the ship for the purpose of conducting business shall be as directed by a separate Instruction.

b. Inspection of Packages and Baggage Leaving the Ship.

(1) Members of the crew with packages to be mailed from the ship or with baggage or packages to be taken off the ship, shall prepare a property pass form and present this pass, and the package or baggage, to their Division Officer for inspection.

(2) The Post Office shall not accept packages for mailing without a signed property pass.

(3) The Officer of the Deck, the Junior Officer of the Deck, shall retain property passes when presented with packages or baggage for inspection, except when personnel are required to pass through Navy Yard or Base gates, and shall allow no member of the crew to leave the ship with baggage or packages for which there is no property pass.

c. Inspection of Stores and Provisions Received on Board. A representative of the department concerned shall inspect all stores and provisions prior to or immediately after being brought aboard to insure that the material is safe for stowage, and that the security of this material is properly safeguarded.

d. Inspection of Individual Lockers. Periodically, all lockers and living spaces shall be inspected by Division Officers and other officers to locate any contraband, unauthorized arms and ammunition, explosives, and literature or propaganda detrimental to the best interest of the United States.

1 DEC 1971

e. Security of Magazine Keys The security of the ship's magazine containing ammunition and explosives largely depends on the control of the keys to those spaces. The subject of the custody and handling of the magazine keys is covered by a separate Instruction.

DISTRIBUTION: (See NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 5605.1B)
List I (Case A)

1 DEC 1971

NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.3B

Subj: Lower Deck Patrol

1. Purpose. To establish Lower Deck Patrols for this ship and to provide those instructions necessary for the proper functioning of these patrols.

2. Cancellation. AIRLANT/AIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.3A

3. Objective. To provide additional security in the ship after Taps against fire, dangerous conditions, theft of Government and personal property, violation of ship's orders, and improper lighting conditions.

4. Responsibilities

a. Heads of Departments shall provide Petty Officers for these patrols as requested by the Chief Master-at-Arms.

b. The Officer of the Deck shall insure that all Lower Deck Patrols are posted, that personnel are properly instructed and are in the Uniform of the Day, and that posts are checked several times each watch.

c. The Chief Master-at-Arms shall:

(1) Insure that personnel detailed to Lower Deck Patrols report promptly and are in the Uniform of the Day.

(2) Instruct all Lower Deck Patrol personnel in their duties and insure that they fully understand their orders.

(3) Require the Duty Master-at-Arms to inspect patrols at frequent intervals and supervise personnel in the performance of their duties.

5. Procedure

a. Lower Deck Patrols shall:

(1) Be comprised of rated men.

(2) Be furnished by all Departments of the ship with the exception of Medical, Dental, and Navigation.

(3) Commence at Tattoo and continue until Reveille.

(4) Be in the Uniform of the Day.

(5) Be equipped with duty belts, nightsticks, flashlights and whistles.

16

1 DEC 1971

b. Lower Deck Patrol Posts. The posts of the Lower Deck Patrols shall be established by the Chief Master-at-Arms and shall divide the ship below the hangar deck into four equal areas. One post shall be established and manned for each of these four areas. In making the rounds of the Posts, the Lower Deck Patrols shall give particular attention to living spaces, ship's stores, and storerooms.

c. Lower Deck Patrol Orders. Each member of the Lower Deck Patrol shall be required to know, understand, and enforce the following orders:

(1) The limits of this post are _____ (specify limits as established by the Chief Master-at-Arms).

(2) Take charge of this Post and all Government property therein.

(3) To walk my post in a military manner, being constantly on the alert to detect fire, dangerous conditions, theft, and other crimes or violations of Ship's Orders.

(4) To apprehend and report immediately to the Officer of the Deck anyone committing a crime or violating Ship's Orders.

(5) Report once each hour to the Boatswain's Mate of the Watch when all is secured on my Post.

(6) Report immediately to the Officer of the Deck any fires or dangerous conditions discovered.

(7) To speak to no one except in the line of duty.

(8) To quit my post only when properly relieved.

(9) Turn off all unnecessary white lights and turn on all standing (red) lights at Taps.

(10) Turn on necessary white lights and turn off all standing (red) lights at Reveille.

(11) Enforce any special lighting conditions in effect.

(12) To receive, obey, and pass on, all Special Orders of the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Command Duty Officer, Officer of the Deck or Junior Officer of the Deck.

(13) Call the Officer of the Deck in any case not covered by these or Special Orders.

DISTRIBUTION: (See NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 5605.1B)
List I (Case A)

1 DEC 1971

NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.4B

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Visitors and Guests; policies and procedures for handling

Ref: (a) U. S. Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter

1. Purpose. To establish policies and set forth procedures for the handling of visitors and guests aboard this vessel.

2. Cancellation. AIRLANT/AIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.4A.

3. Definitions. For the purpose of this Instruction, the following definitions are applicable:

a. Guest. Any person who is not a member of the ship's company, or not a member of a staff using the ship as a flag ship, who is invited on board by a person attached to the ship.

b. Visitor. An individual, other than a guest, who visits the ship.

4. Policy.

a. There shall be no general visiting aboard this vessel. Visiting under special circumstances will be authorized by competent authority. Visitors shall be accorded every courtesy and consideration consistent with the security of the ship. Every effort shall be made to have each visitor leave the ship with a good impression of the Navy and of the ship.

b. Officers and enlisted personnel are encouraged to bring members of their family, and others who are well known to them, on board as their guests.

5. Responsibility. Assurance of the loyalty and integrity of guests shall be the responsibility of the person who invites them aboard. Each officer and man is cautioned against inviting any person aboard about whom he knows little or nothing.

6. Security. During all visits to both foreign and U. S. ports, the security of the ship is paramount, and the handling of visitors and guests shall be administered accordingly. During visiting hours all officers and petty officers shall be alert to detect and detain any person acting in a suspicious manner. Loiterers shall be regarded with suspicion and their presence investigated. In addition, the following action shall be taken:

a. The Ship's Security Officer (Weapons Officer) shall in addition to the requirements herein, effect such measures as he deems necessary to provide security of this ship and to insure compliance with reference (a).

b. The Chief Master-at-Arms shall assist the Command Duty Officer, the Officer of the Deck, and the ship's Security Officer as requested during visiting hours.

1 DEC 1971

7. Authorized Visiting Areas. The following areas are the only authorized areas in which visitors and guests may be permitted:

a. Guests, Officers: Wardroom and Lounge, Staterooms, Hangar Deck, Flight Deck, and Island Structure (less Flag Plot, Communications and Radar spaces).

b. Guests, CPO's: CPO Mess, Hangar Deck, Flight Deck, and Island Structure (less Flag Plot, Communications and Radar spaces).

c. Guests, Enlisted other than CPO: Crew's Recreation Room, Hangar Deck, Flight Deck, and Island Structure (less Flag Plot, Communications and Radar spaces).

d. Visitors: Hangar Deck, Forward and After Elevators, Flight Deck. When escorted they may be permitted in the Island Structure (less Flag Plot, Communications and Radar spaces).

8. Procedure.

a. Guests. All persons who have invited guests aboard shall make every effort to meet them at the gangway when they arrive. If this is not possible, the Officer of the Deck shall detain the guests at the brow, and notify the host of their presence, either by phone or messenger. The host shall escort or provide for proper escort of guests at all times while on board, and shall ensure that guests enter only authorized spaces listed in paragraph 7.

b. Visitors, in Limited Numbers and Small Organized Parties, when authorized to come aboard by the Commanding Officer, shall be identified and logged in by the Officer of the Deck, and an escort provided for each twelve (12) visitors or less. Escorts shall be instructed to require visitors to adhere to specific routes, and to deny them entry to other than authorized spaces, as specified herein. Escorts shall remain with assigned visitors until they leave the ship.

c. Visitors, in Large Numbers and Large Organized Parties are often authorized when in foreign ports and on special occasions in the U.S. In these circumstances, the following procedure shall be followed:

(1) The Executive Officer will promulgate information regarding such visitors, and will prescribe the following:

- (a) Visiting hours.
- (b) Number of guides required from each department.
- (c) Beach Guard and Dock Sentry requirements.
- (d) Boat Officer requirements.

1 DEC 1971

(e) Special requirements, such as displays of exhibits, and platforms for viewing aircraft.

(2) The Command Duty Officer shall be in overall charge of visiting and shall designate one of his assistants as Officer in Charge of Guides.

(3) Heads of Departments and Air Group, Squadron, or Detachment Commanders shall detail and notify required personnel, as directed by the Executive Officer.

(4) The Air Officer shall assign flight deck sentries in sufficient numbers to prevent entry into unauthorized spaces and catwalks, and to prevent damage to government property. Assign elevator operators and safety patrols. Rope off areas as necessary. De-gas planes and purge gasoline lines as desirable.

(5) Air Group, Squadron, or Detachment Commander (Air Officer when Air Group or Squadron not embarked) shall assign sentries in the vicinity of all airplanes to prevent damage and unauthorized entry.

(6) The Weapons Officer shall assign sentries at hatches and doors on the hangar deck to prevent entry into unauthorized spaces, and to prevent damage to government property. Rope off areas and close hatches as required. Arrange for posting of applicable signs throughout visiting areas.

(7) The Administrative Assistant shall compile and publish lists of guides, and prepare information folder for the Officer in Charge of Guides.

(8) The Officer in Charge of Guides shall call away and muster guides not less than 30 minutes prior to commencement of visiting. Guides shall be stationed as follows:

(a) An officer guide at the bottom of each accommodation ladder or gangway to greet visitors, identify them and collect invitations.

(b) Assign a roving patrol as deemed desirable.

(c) Assign a guide to each group of visitors of 12 or less.

(9) The Personnel Officer shall detail interpreters to report to the Officer in Charge of Guides as required.

DISTRIBUTION: (See NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 5605.1B)
List I (Case A)

1 DEC 1971

NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.5B

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Handling of Civilian Personnel Coming Aboard Ship for the Purpose of
Conducting Business

Ref: (a) U. S. Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter

1. Purpose. To establish policies and procedures for the handling of civilian personnel who come aboard the ship to conduct business.

2. Cancellation. AIRLANT/AIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.5A

3. Policy. Insofar as practicable, officers and men shall schedule appointments for conducting personal business on board this vessel outside of normal working hours. Civilian business agents shall be under escort at all times while on board, whether engaged in personal business with members of the ship's company or on official business with Heads of Departments or other officers. General solicitation of non-official trade shall not be permitted on board this vessel. The ship's company shall be protected from undue annoyance by tradesmen and agents, and at the same time, afforded reasonable opportunity to conduct necessary personal business on board.

4. General Procedure. Reference (a) outlines security requirements regarding visitors. Except in unusual circumstances, civilian business agents are expected to have appointments or legitimate business with specific individuals aboard the ship. The procedure for handling civilian business agents is as follows:

a. The Officer of the Deck shall determine the nature of the business the civilian agents desires to conduct on board, and the name and official status of the individual the agent desires to see.

b. The Officer of the Deck shall then call or send the business card of the visitor to the officer or man and determine if he desires to see the visitor and, if so, where he wishes the business to be conducted.

c. The Officer of the Deck shall then provide an escort for the agent, or detain the visitor at the Quarterdeck or After Brow, pending arrival of the officer or man concerned who shall be responsible for escorting the visitor.

d. The officer or man concerned shall, upon completion of his business, provide an escort to the Quarterdeck, or After Brow, notifying the OOD or JOOD upon arrival.

5. Service and Merchandise Vendors. All civilians who desire to transact business in connection with matters under the cognizance of the Supply Department shall be referred to the Supply Officer, or his representative, for interview to determine if the individual should be permitted to transact business aboard this vessel in accordance with the following policy:

a. No vendors shall be permitted to sell merchandise or services directly to the crew, on

ENCLOSURE 18

NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC

CV SHIP INST 5500.5B

1 DEC 1971

the hangar deck, or anywhere else on the ship, except the following:

(1) Newspaper and periodical vendors.

(2) Dry cleaning agents.

(3) Such other tradesmen as may be authorized by the Executive Officer in unusual situations.

b. Newspaper and periodical vendors, or dry cleaning agents shall not be permitted on the ship unless a pass has been issued by the Executive Officer, on the recommendation of the Supply Officer.

6. Tour Agents. All tour agents shall be referred to the designated Tours Officer upon their arrival aboard in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 above.

7. Insurance Representatives. All Insurance Representatives shall be referred to the Insurance Officer (Legal Officer) in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 above. Insurance Representatives may leave explanatory literature or return-addressed postal cards for the officers and men of the ship's company with the Insurance Officer, or mail such material to the ship. The Insurance Officer shall in turn see that such material is placed in the various lounges and messes throughout the ship for the information of the ship's company. Accredited Insurance Representatives may conduct business with specific officers and enlisted personnel, on a pre-arranged appointment basis, outside of normal working hours.

8. Rosters. No person shall, at any time, provide a roster of the names and addresses of personnel attached to this ship to anyone except as is necessary in the performance of his official duties.

DISTRIBUTION: (See NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 5605.1B)
List J (Case A)

1 DEC 1971

NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 3541.4B

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Material Condition; proper maintenance of

1. Purpose. To promulgate a procedure for the proper maintenance of material conditions.
2. Cancellation. AIRLANT/AIRPAC CV SHIP INST 3541.4A
3. Responsibilities
 - a. In-Port. Department Duty Officers are responsible for ascertaining that prescribed material conditions are effected within their respective departmental spaces.
 - b. Underway. Division Officers are responsible for the proper setting of prescribed material conditions.
4. Procedure
 - a. When "Water Tight Doors" is sounded and the word is passed for all divisions to set the prescribed material condition, all duty Division Damage Control Petty Officers shall inspect their division spaces and insure that the prescribed material condition has been properly set.
 - b. Division Damage Control Petty Officers shall then report to Damage Control Central that the prescribed material condition has been set in their divisional spaces.
 - c. Permission must be obtained from Damage Control Central to temporarily open doors and hatches specified for closure in the applicable condition. Damage Control Central shall maintain a closure log in which shall be recorded:
 - (1) The name, rate, and division of the person requesting permission to open a door or hatch.
 - (2) The designation of the type fitting, classification, and number to be opened in violation of material condition.
 - (3) Time and date that the fitting is opened and closed.
 - (4) Signature of person granting permission.
 - d. Once permission from Damage Control Central is obtained to open water tight fittings that would be in violation of the prescribed material condition, it is necessary that the space being entered be manned until the designated fitting is properly secured, and under no condition should the space be left unmanned until the prescribed material condition is in effect.

CS
ENCLOSURE (19)

NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC
CV SHIP INST 3541.4B

1 DEC 1971

e. Patrols shall be established in designated areas to make regular and thorough inspections and shall report all violations of the prescribed material condition and improper fire prevention practices to Central Control. Responsibilities for the various areas, establishment, instruction, and performance of these patrols shall be as follows:

- (1) Engineer Officer. Area below Hangar Deck level.
- (2) Air Officer. Hangar Deck level up to and including the Flight Deck.
- (3) Operations Officer. Island structure.
- (4) Weapons Officer. Magazines and handling rooms.

DISTRIBUTION: (See NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 5605.1B)
List I (Case A)

USS RANGER [CVA-61]

FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96691

RANGERINST 5500.4

17

28 May 1970

USS RANGER INSTRUCTION 5500.4

From: Commanding Officer, USS RANGER (CVA-61)
To: Distribution List

Subj: Visitors and guests; policies and procedures for handling

Ref: (a) NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.4A

Encl: (1) General Visiting Instructions
(2) General Visiting Route
(3) Duty Guides

1. Purpose. An addendum to reference (a) which delineates those additional procedures and or responsibilities peculiar to USS RANGER (CVA-61).
2. General. Visitor and guest policy and procedure will be in accordance with reference (a); however, there are additional procedures peculiar to RANGER. These additional procedures are set forth below.
3. Visiting Hours. Visiting hours shall be from liberty call until tattoo. Visiting hours may be extended until the termination of the evening movie and upon other occasions when approved by the Command Duty Officer. Visitors who arrive unannounced during working hours should be tactfully asked to return after working hours. An exception to this rule will be made if at any time a visitor of significant stature arrives. In such a case, the Command Duty Officer shall be notified and an officer appointed to serve as escort.
4. General Visiting. Amplifying instructions for general visiting are set forth in enclosure (1).
5. Guest Log. The OOD and JOOD shall maintain guest logs at the quarter-deck and afterbrow for logging in and out guests of personnel attached to the ship.
6. Duty Guides. The assignment, qualifications, functions, and responsibilities of duty guides are set forth in enclosure (3).

B-6

Distribution:
NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 5605.1A
List I, Less R, Case B

08158

ENCLOSURE 20

GENERAL VISITING

1. General Visiting

a. During the hours of general visiting all visitors, except escorted officers' guests, shall board at the after brow.

b. Guides shall be instructed to require visitors to adhere to specific routes, and to deny them entry to other than authorized areas.

c. The tour route for general visitors shall be as follows (see enclosure (2)):

(1) From Hangar Bay One, visitors shall be guided aft into Hangar Bay Two. Static displays will be placed along this route so that visitors do not interfere with the quarterdeck.

(2) Visitors will then be guided onto elevator two and ride it to the flight deck.

(3) Guides will ensure that there is an orderly flow of visitors from the elevator to the flight deck. After viewing number one and two catapults, guides will direct the groups aft, stopping briefly at the island structure.

(4) Visitors will then be guided aft to the arresting wires.

(5) Visitors will then take elevator four down to the hangar bay and shall proceed directly to the after brow and depart the ship. Guides shall personally escort the group to the after brow, and announce that the tour is completed. Every effort will be made to have each visitor leave the ship with a good impression of the Navy and of RANGER.

2. Responsibilities of the Command Duty Officer/Assistant Command Duty Officer.

a. Personally inspect all visiting areas for cleanliness two hours prior to commencement of visiting.

b. Ensure rigging of guide lines, posting necessary signs, readiness of elevators, and scrupulous attention to the safety of visitors.

c. Muster and brief sentries 45 minutes prior to commencement of general visiting.

d. Post sentries 30 minutes prior to commencement of visiting.

08138

Enclosure (1)

RANGERINST 5500.4
20 May 1970

e. Maintain integrity of visiting routes during visiting. All sentries will require visitors and guests to remain within the guide lines. There will be no exception to this rule without specific authorization of the CDO.

f. Ensure compliance with the highest standards of cleanliness, courtesy and military bearing while visitors are aboard.

g. Ensure that all visitors leave the ship as scheduled.

h. Inform the OOD to pass the word "Secure from General Visiting" after the last visitor has left the ship.

3. Sentries. Sentries shall be assigned by the Air Officer and the Weapons Officer, and the First Lieutenant as follows:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
<u>Hangar Deck</u> Posted by Weps. and Deck Departments (15 for each)	30
<u>Flight Deck</u> Posted by Air Dept.	22
<u>Elevators</u> Air Dept. assign to each elevator	1 PO and 5 men
Engineering Dept.	3 men

4. Assisting Officers. Officers will be assigned to assist the Command Duty Officer as follows:

a. <u>Air Group Embarked</u>	
Air Group	6
Operations	2
b. <u>Air Group not Embarked</u>	
Operations	4
Executive	1
Supply	1
Engineering	2

c. Heads of departments will provide the CDO/ACDO with the names of the assisting officers at least 24 hours prior to commencement of general visiting.

d. Assisting officers will muster with the ACDO one hour prior to commencement of visiting.

Enclosure (1)

5. The Air Officer: The Air Officer shall be responsible for rigging of guide lines, placement of static displays, and material readiness and manning of elevators. The Air Officer shall station petty officers on the flight deck to explain fresnel lens, catapults and arresting gear.

6. The Weapons Officer: The Weapons Officer, as Ship's Security Officer, is responsible for assisting the CDO with problems relative to security and placement of sentries. He will require the Marine Detachment to have a riot force in standby status during General Visiting, plus Marine sentries on the pier as necessary to assist the base police in controlling traffic. The Weapons Officer shall provide indentifying insignia for sentries.

7. The First Lieutenant: The First Lieutenant is responsible for the arrangement of all boating necessary in connection with visiting. He shall also provide guidelines on the hangar deck and flight deck as illustrated in enclosure (8).

8. The CMAA: The CMAA will post applicable signs throughout visiting areas, provide liaison with the Weapons Department to ensure compliance with security regulations, and provide a roving patrol to ensure maintenance of the highest standard of military dress and bearing. If at anchor, he shall provide a minimum of 75 chairs in the vicinity of the after accommodation ladder.

9. The Medical Officer: The Medical Officer shall provide first aid and emergency treatment for visitors.



10. The Administrative Assistant: The Administrative Assistant will provide four men to count visitors and pass out information pamphlets.

11. The Public Affairs Officer: The Public Affairs Officer will provide prepared handouts for distribution, arrange for photographic and media coverage if deemed appropriate, and provide special briefing for the Command Duty Officer as desired. In addition, he will make the duty journalist available at extension 790, compartment 03-236-4-Q to assist the CDO.

12. The Officer of the Deck: The OOD will ensure that all boating regulations are enforced and maintain a count of all visitors on board.

13. All preparations will be completed not later than 60 minutes prior to commencement of visiting.

Enclosure (2)



- Permanent Guide Lines
- Temporary Guide Lines
- X Sentries
- Direction of Traffic

08158

Enclosure (2)

DUTY GUIDES

1. Source of Guides: A monthly list of duty guides will be published by the Public Affairs Office. Guides shall be provided by departments as indicated:

Admin:	1	Engineering:	2
ATMD:	1	Operations:	2
Air:	2	Supply:	2
Communications:	1	Weapons:	1
Deck	1	Air Wing	2

2. Duty Guide Qualifications and Responsibilities: Duty guides shall be first or second class petty officers who have been assigned to the ship for at least four months and who can conduct an informative tour of the ship for civilians unfamiliar with an attack carrier. Guides shall read and become familiar with the Duty Guide Booklet prepared and distributed with duty guide list by the Public Affairs Officer. Guides shall report immediately after they are called away over the IMC or the telephone.

3. Departmental Responsibilities: One week prior to the end of each month, departments concerned will submit to the Public Affairs Officer the names of the required number of duty guides. Two telephone numbers where the guide can be reached and each guide's division will be submitted along with each name. Departments shall insure that duty guides are not assigned shore patrol or other duties which will conflict with duty guide responsibilities. In the event a guide is authorized leave, special liberty, or otherwise cannot perform guide duties, the department will provide a qualified substitute and so notify the Public Affairs Officer.

4. Public Affairs Office Responsibility: Three days prior to the end of each month, the Public Affairs Officer shall publish and distribute the duty guides list for the next month. The list shall be distributed to the Executive Officer, the CDO folder, the OOD, JOOD, concerned departments, and to the Administrative Assistant for publication in the Plan of the Day.

5. Standbys: Duty guides desiring standbys shall have their special request forms signed by the Administrative Office before bringing them to the Public Affairs Office.

08158

Enclosure (3)

CHAPTER 2 - WATCH ORGANIZATION

Section 3 - In-Port Watch Organization

Sub-Section A - ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT DUTY OFFICER

2301. Basic Function

The Engineering Department Duty Officer is designated by the Engineer Officer to stand a day's duty and supervise the routine of the Engineering Department during a particular day in port. While on duty, and during the absence of the Engineer Officer, he shall act on behalf of the Engineer Officer in all routine departmental matters and shall be responsible for the security and proper functioning of the Department.

2302. Duties, Responsibilities and Authority

The Engineering Department Duty Officer shall:

1. With the Officer of the Deck's permission, blow tubes at least once each twelve hours in steaming boilers unless otherwise directed. If permission is refused, log that fact. If twelve (12) hours pass without blowing tubes, so inform the Engineer Officer.
2. Insure the maintenance of the prescribed fire main pressure.
3. Insure that all engineering and damage security patrols are alert and maintaining proper security.
4. Insure that the watch is properly maintained and relieved and that all logs and records are properly kept.
5. Insure that no persons, except those in duty status or authorized by competent authority, enter the machinery spaces.
6. Before taking over the duty, satisfy himself as to the status of all operating machinery, machinery out of commission and under repair and precautions taken, work in progress, all unexecuted orders, fuel oil and reserve feed tanks in use, tanks, voids, or watertight compartments that are open, any special instructions to be passed along, and any other matters affecting his tour of duty. Insure that other officers of his duty section and responsible petty officers are similarly briefed and know their duties.
7. Know and exercise all safety precautions, operating instructions, and casualty control procedures and initiate prompt and effective action in case of casualties.
8. Supervise the preparation and distribution of the day's duty watch list.
9. Keep the Engineering Supervisory Watch informed of his whereabouts and how he may be reached and supervise this watch in the performance of assigned duties.

CS158

2-3-A1

ENCLOSURE (2/)

10. In the absence of the Main Propulsion Assistant and the Engineer Officer, sign the Daily Fuel Oil and Water Report and insure that copies are delivered to the Officer of the Deck prior to 1130.

11. Make frequent inspections of living compartments and engineering spaces to insure the physical security and good order thereof.

12. Require inspection of all engineering living compartments after "Taps" and insure that order is being maintained.

13. Inspect all operating machinery as necessary to insure that it is being operated properly. He will insure that *no* openings to the sea are guarded by sea valves only and that blank flanges are placed over all openings to sea valves where piping, etc., has been removed for any purpose. Condensers (Main and Auxiliary) shall not be left open overnight. Blank flanges will be secured inboard of the injection and overboard valves, or condenser heads and inspection plates shall be replaced before work is stopped on the condenser.

14. At 1600 each day, when in drydock, he will require reports from each Division Officer to the effect that all sea valves and outboard openings, upon which shipyard workmen and/or ship's force are not continuing work, are secured for the night. This fact will be reported to the Officer of the Deck and to the Senior Engineering Department Officer on board by 1700.

15. Assign Engineering Department working parties and other details outside of normal working hours in accordance with the policies established by the Engineer Officer.

16. Supervise all Engineering Department repairs after normal working hours.

17. When a boiler is lighted off, or when a boiler is cut in, insure that competent petty officers are present in the machinery spaces. When important changes in other operating equipment are made, he will insure that a competent officer or petty officer supervises the action.

18. When the ship is to get underway, prepare the underway watch list and lighting off orders. He, or an officer from his section, shall stand the first watch.

19. Receive security reports from the Engineering Department Duty Officers and Petty Officers in designated space prior to making "eight o'clock reports" to the Executive Officer or Command Duty Officer, insure that instructions for the night to other officers of the duty section and to responsible petty officers are complete and understood, make the "eight o'clock reports" to the Executive Officer or Command Duty Officer and to the Engineer Officer when on board, and inform them of the status of the Engineering Plant.

20. Prepare and sign the Engineering log at the end of the day's duty.

21. Normally station himself in or about the log Room or Central Control when there are no evolutions or situations requiring his presence elsewhere.

22. When absent from the Log Room or Central Control, keep the Duty Yeoman and Petty Officer of the Watch informed as to where he can be located.

23. Perform such other duties as may be assigned.

2303. Organizational Relationships

1. The Engineering Department Duty Officer reports to:

a. The Officer of the Deck for the security and proper functioning of the Engineering Department.

b. The Engineer Officer for assignment to watches and performance of assigned duties.

2. The following report to him:

a. Engineering Divisional Duty Petty Officers.

b. Engineering Supervisory Watch.

c. Engineering Department Duty Yeoman.

19 May 1972

USS RANGER INSTRUCTION 5500.2A

Subj: Security of the Ship in Port

- Ref: (a) NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.1
 (b) NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.2
 (c) Marine Detachment Order 5500.1
 (d) RANGERINST 5500.1
 (e) RANGERINST 8110.5
 (f) Allied Naval Maneuver Instruction (ATPLA), Vol 1

- Encl: (1) Diagram of External Security Posts
 (2) External Security Posts Manned while visiting a Naval Activity or Civilian Port CONUS
 (3) External Security Posts Manned while visiting a Naval Activity or Civilian Port outside CONUS
 (4) Special Security Precautions in Port (OPERATION BABELON)
 (5) Responsibilities and Emergency Procedures for Special Weapons Accident and Incident

1. Purpose. This directive establishes procedures and operating instructions, and assigns responsibilities for the maintenance of the internal and external security of the vessel.

2. Cancellation. RANGERINST 5500.2 and RANGERNOTE 5510 of 11 April 1972

3. General. Internal and external security of the ship while in port and underway will be administered in accordance with references (a) and (b). The procedures described in this directive will provide security measures requisite to the execution of the daily routine, and special precautions for possible emergency situations.

4. Definitions

a. Internal Security includes all measures taken by personnel on this vessel to prevent surprise attack, to provide early warning of boarding attack by a hostile force, to prevent unauthorized attempts to board the ship, to quell any riots or civil disturbances that threaten the ship, and to prevent sabotage of the ship, its equipment and personnel.

ENCLOSURE (2-2)

10 May 1972

b. Internal Security includes all practices, precautions, and safeguards employed to prevent unauthorized individuals or parties from gaining access to classified matter or equipment, to prevent sabotage, theft or unauthorized observation, and to prevent instigation of deliberate acts harmful to embarked personnel or equipment.

5. Responsibility.

a. The Weapons Officer is designated as the Security Officer; he shall be responsible for:

(1) Making recommendations to the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer, and the Heads of Departments regarding the practices and precautions taken to safeguard equipment and classified matter.

(2) Cooperating with the Classified Material Control Officer and providing assistance in matters concerning security of classified matter.

(3) Ensuring that personnel are assigned and equipment made available for the various external security requirements described in reference (b), in directives from higher authority, and according to the needs of the current situation.

(4) Establishing and maintaining adequate security and the operation of the small arms locker.

(5) The instruction, posting, and periodic inspection of external security sentries when the Marine Detachment is not embarked.

b. The Commanding Officer, Marine Detachment is designated as the Assistant Security Officer; his responsibilities include:

(1) Promulgation of specific instructions concerning the detailed duties of each security post described in reference (b) and paragraph 5 (a) of this directive. Enclosure (1) depicts the location of security posts aboard the ship.

(2) The competent and efficient operation of the ship's external security system pursuant to the completion of his external security duties, the CO, MARDET is accorded full authority in matters concerning the training, posting, and utilization of external security sentries.

(3) Issuance and recovery of guard equipment used by duty sentries.

19 May 1972

(4) Organizing and training an effective civil disturbance/riot control force.

(5) Providing any assistance required, and technical advice to the Security Officer in matters concerning internal/external security.

c. Department Heads are charged with:

(1) Security of all equipment and classified matter under their cognizance, and for the indoctrination of departmental personnel in security precautions, practices, and safeguards.

(2) Establishment and efficient operation of roving patrols, sentry posts, duty officers, integrity watches, or other means as enumerated in applicable departmental security instructions.

(3) Provide the required sentries for the daily guard as listed in enclosures (2) and (3). Duty Rosters of assigned sentries will be delivered to the Senior Watch Officer not later than 24 hours prior to the applicable duty day.

d. Division Officers will:

(1) Periodically inspect all individual lockers and living spaces under their cognizance in order to locate any contraband, unauthorized arms or ammunition, explosives, and literature or propaganda detrimental to the best interests of the United States.

(2) Inspect for contraband or stolen items in all packages and baggage that are to be mailed or removed from the ship by members of his division. Property passes will be issued after inspection.

e. The Engineering Officer shall be responsible for the illumination of the ship's waterline from sunset to sunrise in all foreign ports when the external security posts are manned. This illumination shall be provided in such a manner that any boat or swimmer attempting to approach the ship may be observed.

f. The First Lieutenant shall equip, organize and train an effective picket boat patrol as described in paragraph 6 (2).

g. The Officer of the Deck shall be responsible for:

(1) The vigilance of the external security sentries at all times.

(2) The implementation of any special security precautions should the need arise.

15 May 1972

(3) The positive identification of all persons allowed access to the ship, by means described in reference (b). Any cases of doubtful identity shall be reported to the Executive Officer or his representative, and as long as any doubt remains, measures shall be taken to deny freedom of movement and to classified matter or equipment.

h. The Junior Officer of the Deck shall:

(1) Assist the Officer of the Deck in identification of personnel.

(2) Retain property passes when presented with packages or baggage for inspection except when personnel are required to pass through Navy Yard or Base Gates, and shall allow no member of the crew to leave the ship with baggage or packages for which there is no property pass.

i. The Chief-Master-At-Arms shall :

(1) Organize and train the MAA force for use in suppressing minor disturbances involving crew members.

(2) Provide personnel for periodic patrols of the entire ship to insure that security measures are being properly employed.

5. Procedure

a. Normal External Security Precautions. Normal precautions provide for sentry posts on board and ashore, and for a picket boat patrol, when directed. In general, it is the duty of these security sentries to give early warning of any potential hazard to the ship's security and to prevent the approach of suspicious or unauthorized personnel/objects towards the ship's side.

(1) External Security Posts

(a) General. Fourteen (14) external security posts are established on the outer perimeter of the ship. While anchored or moored, these posts will be manned twenty-four hours a day, unless otherwise directed by the Security Officer.

(b) Assignment. Enclosures (1), (2), and (3) delineate the specific appointment of the various internal security posts by: post number, location, responsible department, and manning requirements.

(c) Implementation. Reference (a) contains special and general orders pertaining to each security post. All watchstanders will

muster with the Corporal of the Guard on the Forward Mess Deck, Frame #89 not later than one-half (1/2) hour prior to the commencement of duty; at this time duty equipment and any special instructions will be disseminated. Uniform is uniform of the day with white duty belt and white leggings. All watch-standers will familiarize themselves with paragraph seven of this order and be guided in the use of force accordingly.

(2) Picket Boat Patrol. The armed picket boat patrol will operate from sunset to sunrise when directed by higher authority or when required by the local situation. Reports to the OOD will be made at irregular intervals during each circuit of the ship. This patrol consists of the following:

(a) Organization and Armament

<u>BOAT CREW</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT PROVIDING</u>	<u>WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION</u>
Boat Officer	Deck/Duty Section	.45 Cal pistol w/10 Rds
Coxswain	Deck	"
Fore-Boom	"	"
Signalman	X Comm	"
Sentry	Weps	Thompson SMG with 2 mags
Gunner's Mate	Weps	M-1 rifle w/2 8rd clips
Lookouts (2)	Weps	

(b) Equipment

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>PROVIDED</u>
1. Wet-cell bull-eye lantern	2	E DIV
2. Megaphone	1	R DIV
3. Handy bill w/suction and discharge hose w/nosale	1	
4. Signs in the language of the port saying "Do not approach within fifty feet of this vessel", "Halt" and "Go Away"	As required	
5. Chart of the anchorage showing location of ships present	1	NAV

b. Special Security Precautions. In the event of danger to the ship or ship's personnel such as: riot, civil disturbances, swimmers in the water, bomb threats, an airborne attack/threat, special weapons accident or incident, prisoner escape, underwater attack, or any other situation that would require the Officer of the Deck to increase security precautions, the following special security evaluations are prescribed: (Requisite to the situation of any special security evaluations, the OOD will utilize all MC circuits regardless of the time of day).

(1) Operation Babylon is the Special Security evolution that is initiated when emergency situations necessitate increased physical security and/or immediate mustering of designated personnel in order to facilitate protection of the ship. Enclosure (4) contains implementing instructions for this evolution. In the event of bomb threats, the CDO/ODD will be guided by reference (d).

(2) Operation "Bent Spear" and "Broken Arrow" are procedures initiated in the event of a special weapons accident or incident. Upon receipt of information necessitating the enactment of "Bent Spear" or "Broken Arrow" the OOD will commence emergency procedures as described in enclosure (5). Actions by other responsible personnel in Bent Spear/Broken Arrow are summarized in enclosure (5), and enumerated in detail in reference (a).

(3) Prisoner Escape. Upon notification by Correctional Facility personnel that a prisoner has escaped, the OOD will secure all laws and pass the word for the SMAA force and Divisional DCPO's to muster in Hangar Bay No. 1. The MAA's, DCPO's and the Marine Detachment will comprise the search party; the Executive Officer or the CDO (if in port) will designate an officer-in-charge of the search party. Upon discovery of the escapes or transmission of the search by the Executive Officer, the OOD will pass over all MC circuits to secure all search parties and report all losses.

(4) Air Defense. At all times underway, anchored, or moored, the Weapons Officer, or in his absence the Weapons Department Duty Officer, shall be responsible for the implementation of the anti-aircraft gunnery phases of the current Air Defense Bill applicable in the event of such attack by enemy planes. If an actual threat of attack is imminent, "Air Defense" shall be sounded and all air defense stations shall be manned and be prepared to repel attacks upon order. The anti-aircraft stations to be manned, whether anchored or moored, shall be determined by the Weapons Officer and promulgated by Weapons Department directives. Service ammunition shall be in the hoists and up to the carrier decks at the discretion of the Commanding Officer.

(5) Defense Against Underwater Attack. While in foreign ports and upon notification by higher authorities or at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, underwater attack countermeasures will be initiated in accordance with reference (f).

Weapons Handling Instructions

(a) Safety procedures. If a sentry is to be armed with a firearm, he will have fired that weapon for qualification or familiarization within the past twelve (12) months. Sentries will be fully instructed in the

use of the weapon with which they are armed, they will demonstrate their knowledge of the operation of the piece, and all safety precautions incident to its use to the duty armorer prior to the issuance of the weapon.

b. Use of deadly force. The chamber on all firearms will be kept empty at all times unless it becomes necessary for the sentry to fire his weapon. The application of deadly force is justified ONLY under the following conditions:

(1) To protect one's own life or the life of another person when no other means of defense will be effective.

(2) To prevent the escape of a person known to have committed a serious crime such as armed robbery, murder or rape when no other means are available to prevent such escape.

(3) To prevent acts of sabotage, espionage, and other extremely serious crimes of a like nature against the government, after all other means of preventing such crimes have failed.


In the event that use of the weapon is required, the sentry will order "HALT"; if not obeyed he will repeat "HALT". If the object person still does not obey, the sentry will aim for the lower extremities. The sentry will never point his weapon at any person, unless the use of deadly force is required.

c. Use of night sticks. Sentries armed with night sticks shall use them on another person only as a last resort to preserve order, protect life or property or to enforce order or Naval Regulations. If the existing situation requires the use of a night stick, force shall be applied about the arms, legs, shoulders and thighs, in that order, only. AT NO TIME is the use of a night stick about the head, stomach or back of another person authorized.

H. P. GLINDEMAN, JR.

Distribution:
NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 5605.1B
List I, Case A (less R)

DIAGRAM OF EXTERNAL SECURITY POSTS



Enclosure (1)

EXTERNAL SECURITY POSTS MANNED WHILE VISITING A NAVAL ACTIVITY OR
CIVILIAN PORT CONUS

1. While moored.

<u>POST NO.</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT PROVIDING</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
2	Forecastle, port	WEPS	Manned continuously
4	Sponson 2	AIR	"
6	Sponson 6	OPS	"
8	Fantail, port	AIR	"
9	Fantail, stbd	DECK	"
10 ¹	Trash Receptacle	SUP	0700 - 2200
11 ¹	Pier	AIMD	Manned continuously
12	Forward Brow	MARDET/SUP	0700 - 1800/1800 - 0700
13 ¹	After Brow	DECK	Manned continuously
14 ¹	Parking Lot	ENG	"

¹ Augmentation when directed.

2. While at anchor.

<u>POST NO.</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT PROVIDING</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1	Forecastle, port & stbd.	DECK	Manned continuously
3	Sponson, Fr. #44-55, stbd	AIR	"
4	Sponson 2	AIR	"
7	Sponson 9	OPS	"
8	Fantail, port	WEPS	"
9	Fantail, stbd	DECK	"
10	Fantail (Trash sentry)	SUP	As directed

EXTERNAL SECURITY POSTS MANNED WHILE VISITING A NAVAL ACTIVITY OR
CIVILIAN PORT OUTSIDE CONUS

1. As follows:

<u>POST NO.</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT PROVIDING</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1	Forecastle, stbd	DECK	Manned continuously
2	Forecastle, port	WEPS	"
3	Sponson, Fr. #44-55, stbd	AIR	"
4	Sponson 2	AIR	"
5	Sponson 5	AIR	"
6	Sponson 6	OPS	"
7	Sponson 9	OPS	"
8	Fantail, port	AIR	"
9	Fantail, stbd	DECK	"
10	Trash Receptacle/Fantail	SUP	0700 - 2200

If moored:

11	Pier	AIMD	Manned continuously
12	Forward Brow	MARDET/SUP	0700 - 1800/1800 - 0700
13	After Brow	DECK	Manned continuously

Enclosure (3)

SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN PORT (OPERATION BABYLON)

1. General. Operation Babylon is a special security evolution that is initiated when various emergency situations (i.e. civil disturbances, dissident activities, bomb threats) necessitate increased physical security and/or the immediate mustering of designated personnel in order to facilitate protection of the ship. Three conditions (III, II, I -- in ascending order) of readiness will be utilized in Operation Babylon, each condition will require specific actions/preparations.

2. Action.

a. Action by the Officer of the Deck, as follows:

(1) Upon being alerted to a situation requiring increased security, the Officer of the Deck shall analyze that situation and promulgate the following announcement over all available MC circuits; "OPERATION BABYLON, SET CONDITION (AS REQUIRED)".

b. (2) Notify the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer that Operation Babylon has been called away, and state the cause.

(3) Upon arrival of the CDO/Senior Line Officer Aboard, brief same, and be relieved as Officer in Charge of Operation Babylon (OIC).

b. Implementation, as follows:

CONDITION III:

(1) All Marine Detachment personnel aboard, muster in Hangar Bay No. 1 in accordance with Marine Detachment Order 5500.1; senior marine aboard muster with OIC on Quarterdeck; expert rifleman to duty lifeboat.

(2) Operations Duty Officer prepare OPREP THREE and standby on Quarterdeck.

(3) Communications Watch Officer standby in Main Comm, report to OOD when manned.

(4) Senior SMAA aboard muster with OIC on Quarterdeck; Duty SMAA muster in Hangar Bay No. 1 with three (3) Walkie-Talkie radios.

(5) Department Duty Officers muster in Hangar Bay No. 1 with ACDO.

(6) Man signal bridge. Prepare to activate search-lights (at night hours).

(7) Officer in Charge of EOD Team (if embarked) muster on Quarterdeck with OIC; EOD Team muster in Hangar Bay No. 1.

(8) Medical Department make preparation in accordance with Medical Department SOP.

(9) Man lifeboat/duty boat; prepare to launch as directed.

CONDITION II:

(1) All events as listed in Condition III.

(2) Secure all brows; two (2) marines to each brow.

(3) Non-duty SMAA muster in Hangar Bay No. 1 with ACDO.

(4) Engineering Duty Officer provide portable spotlights as directed by ACDO.

CONDITION I:

(1) All events as listed in Conditions III and II.

(2) In-port Fire Party muster at Repair Locker ONE BRAVO.

(3) Division DCPO's muster in Hangar Bay No. 1 with ACDO.

(4) Two (2) Corpsmen with Unit ONE gear muster in Hangar Bay No. 1 with ACDO.

c. Actions by Officer in Charge of Operation Babylon:

(1) Assume command after being briefed by OOD.

(2) If use of force by marines or ship's force personnel is required, use guidelines as set forth in Marine Detachment Order 5500.1.

(3) Release OPREP THREE five (5) minutes after commencement of Operation Babylon.

(4) Comply with standing orders.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR SPECIAL WEAPONS
ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT

1. Any competent individual in a position to observe a hazard or possible hazard to special weapons shall notify the OOD and recommend "Bent Spear" or "Broken Arrow" as appropriate. He shall then take appropriate steps as deemed necessary to fight the fire (if present), minimize damage, or follow established emergency procedures.
2. Upon occurrence of a special weapons accident (Broken Arrow) or Incident (Bent Spear) the "W" Division Technical Supervisor or EOD Officer, as appropriate, will immediately pass the following word to the OOD and Damage Control Central.

"Broken Arrow" or Bent Spear" as applicable location, fire (if present), contamination (if known), recommendations concerning boundary limits to be set.
3. The OOD cause to be passed over the LMC the following word:

SET CONDITION BROKEN ARROW (OR BENT SPEAR). Weapons accident (and class _____ fire) at (location and frame number). All designated personnel man assigned stations. If contamination is present pass the word "There will be no smoking, eating, or drinking between frames _____ and _____ on the _____ deck until further notice.
4. The CO, MARDET shall deploy personnel in such a manner as to cordon off the affected area and allow, no one except EOD personnel, designated "W" Division personnel, and fire-fighting personnel into the immediate vicinity.
5. The EOD Officer assume control at the site of the accident and carry out the EOD procedures in accordance with established EOD directives.
6. The Executive Officer (at sea) or the Command Duty Officer (in port) assume immediate on-scene control until relieved by the On-Scene Commander.
7. The officer in charge at the scene of the accident shall take immediate action as necessary to minimize the initial results of the accident i.e., by use of EOD and monitoring teams set boundary limits, decide whether general quarters should be sounded.
8. Damage Control Central and officer in charge at the scene keep OOD informed concerning progress of firefighting, monitoring, decontamination, etc.

Enclosure (5)

RANGERINST 5500.2A

19 May 1972

9. Decontamination team supervisor shall advise ACDO and Damage Control Central when absence of contamination is determined, or upon completion of decontamination procedures.

10. The CDO shall notify the OOD to pass over the LMC the following, as applicable:

SECURE FROM CONDITION (BROKEN ARROW) or (BENT SPEAR) resume normal eating and drinking conditions. The smoking lamp is lighted in all authorized spaces.

11. The On-Scene-Commander shall notify the senior command in the area that there has been an accident or significant incident. Request EOD, security, or technical assistance as necessary to supplement the ships force.

12. Information for drafting the initial Accident/Incident message will be passed directly to the Strike Operations Officer or Main Communications by the "W" Division Technical Supervisor or the EOD Officer in accordance with the procedures outlined in reference (e).

13. Supplementary report information in actual "BROKEN ARROW" cases will be submitted as required by reference (e).

14. Public affairs media releases will be made in accordance with reference (e).

Enclosure (5)

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Handwritten notes:
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